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Case Notes
Bills and Notes-Holder In Due Course-UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE-
Saale v. Interstate Steel Co., 27 App. Div. 2d 1, 275 N.Y.S.2d 532 (1966).
THE PLAINTIFF-PAYEE sued the defendant-maker on the latter's failure to redeem its
promissory note at maturity. The maker defended that consideration for the note
failed, Special Term entered summary judgment for the plaintiff as a holder in due
course.
The transaction arose when the corporate defendant agreed to purchase a quan-
tity of identified steel coil, which it later alleged did not meet the specifications of the
sample inspected. Originally, the plaintiff had imported the coil and insured it
against damage in transit. Upon its receipt, the plaintiff notified the insurer of a
damage claim, which was allowed, though the insurer did not immediately indem-
nify its claimant. The insurer advertised a salvage sale for account of "whom it may
concern." After the defendant bid, the plaintiff investigated and approved its credit
background, approved the credit terms and made a signed release of the goods to
the defendant, which gave the note to the insurer for delivery to the plaintiff. On
appeal, a divided court affirmed.'
Anglo-American common law was in general accord on the matter of payees as
holders in due course;2 the payee of a negotiable bill of exchange or promissory note
could be a holder in due course.3 To qualify, it was necessary that he acquire the in-
strument before maturity, in good faith, for value, and without notice of defenses
available to the maker, acceptor, drawer or irregular indorser, against the interme-
diary or remitter from whom he received it.4 Nebraska, prior to its adoption of the
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law,0 was the only American state expressly re-
fusing to accede to the majority view.6
The result reached at common law was not as easily achieved under the N.I.L.7
The difficulty had its basis in the interpretation of § 528 of the uniform law, specifi-
Saale v. Interstate Steel Co., 27 App. Div. 2d 1, 275 N.Y.S.2d 532 (1966).
2Aigler, Payees As Holders In Due Course, 36 YALE L.J. 608, 619 (1927).
' Feezer, May The Payee Of A Negotiable Instrument Be A Holder In Due Course?, 9
MINN. L. REV. 101, 104 (1925).
'E.g., Armstrong v. American Exch. Nat'l Bank, 133 U.S. 433 (1890); Gagle v. Lane, 49
Ark. 465, 5 S.W. 790 (1887); Fairbanks v. Snow, 145 Mass. 153, 13 N.E. 596 (1887); Fullerton
v. Sturgis, 4 Ohio St. 530 (1855); Lookout Bank v. Aull, 93 Tenn. 645, 27 S.W. 1014 (1894);
Jordan v. Jordan, 10 Lea 124, 43 Am. Rep. 294 (Tenn. 1882); Watson v. Russell, 5 B.&S.
968, 122 Eng. Rep. 1090 (K.B. 1864); Munroe v. Bordier, 8 C.B. 862, 137 Eng. Rep. 747
(C.P. 1849).
Neb. Laws 1905, ch. 83.
6 Feezer, supra note 3, at 118; Chariton Plow Co. v. Davidson, 16 Neb. 374 (1884).
The first states to adopt the UNIFORM NEcOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw did so in 1897. See,
BIrrON, BILLS & NOTES § 3 (2d ed. 1961).
SUNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw § 52 provides: A holder in due course is a holder
who has taken the instrument under the following conditions:
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cally § 52 (4),9 requiring that the instrument be "negotiated." There is nothing in
§ 52 (1), (2), or (3) which in any way tends to exclude a payee from being a holder
in due course. 10 By 1923, because of nice distinctions over § 52 (4), all hope for a uni-
form construction of the section was in vain. 11 Notwithstanding the split, there did
emerge a prevailing view 12 that, since a payee was a holder, a transfer to him by the
maker, drawer or remitter was negotiation within the meaning of the N.I.L., and
payees could be holders in due course to the same extent as other holders. 13 New York
was in agreement, 14 Nebraska assented;15 but, instead of a sole dissenter, as at com-
mon law,16 there was a proliferation with Iowa 17 leading nine other states in a con-
trary view.1 s Later adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code by each of these juris-
dictions' 9 is a legislative expression of the dominant view 20 that a payee may be a
holder in due course on a par with other holders. 21
Common law courts and those applying the N.I.L., though not otherwise opposed
to the holder in due course status, have denied it in some circumstances. Grounds
for the refusal have included: after a title defense is interposed, holder failed to
meet his burden of proving himself to be a favored holder; 22 and holder was a prin-
cipal to whom was imputed the knowledge of his agent. 23
1. That it is complete and regular upon its face;
2. That he became the holder of it before it was overdue, and without notice that it
had been dishonored, if such was the fact;
3. That he took it in good faith and for value;
4. That at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any infirmity in
the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating it.
D UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw § 52 (4). For text, supra note 8.
"t BRITTON, op. cit. supra note 7, § 122.
Snyder v. Mc Ewen, 148 Tenn. 423, 429, 256 S.W. 434, 436 (1923).
" BRITTON, op. cit. supra note 7, at § 122.
" See, e.g., Boston Steel & Iron Co. v. Steuer, 183 Mass. 140,66 N.E. 646 (1903); Price v. Klett,
255 Mich. 354, 238 N.W. 253 (1931); Western Sur. Co. v. Friederichs, 241 Minn. 492, 63
N.W.2d 565 (1954); Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Girard Trust Co., 307 Pa. 488, 161 Atl. 865
(1932).
"Bergstrom v. Ritz-Carlton Restaurant & Hotel Co., 171 App. Div. 776, 157 N.Y.Supp.
959 (1916), appeal dismissed, 220 N.Y. 569, 115 N.E. 1033 (1917).
1 Bank of Commerce & Say. v. Randell, 107 Neb. 332, 186 N.W. 70 (1922).
18 Feezer, supra note 3, at 118.
27 Vander Ploeg v. Van Zuuk, 135 Iowa 350, 112 N.W. 807 (1907).
18 Dade-Commonwealth Title Ins. Co. v. Biscayne Kennel Club, 143 So. 2d 713 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1962); Markan Realty Co. v. Klarman, 99 Ga. App. 703, 109 S.E.2d 907 (1959);
Fardy v. Mayerstein, 221 Ind. 339, 41 N.E.2d 851 (1942); Williamson v. Payne, 300 Ky. 161,
188 S.W.2d 96 (1945); Town & Country Shoes Fed. Credit Union v. Cramer, 350 S.W.2d 281
(Kansas City, Mo. Ct. App. 1961); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Central Nat'l Bank, 159
Ohio 423, 112 N.E.2d 636 (1953); Tilley v. Price, 267 P.2d 996 (Okla. 1954); Security Hold-
ing Co. v. Johnson, 57 S.D. 163, 231 N.W. 536 (1930); Capital Nat'l Bank v. Wootton, 369
S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
'
5 ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE LOCALIZER (Supp. 1967).
20By December 1966 forty-nine jurisdictions had adopted the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE.
See, ANDERSON, supra note 19.
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-302 (2) and official comment No. 2.
Alpert v. City Motor Sales, Inc., 194 Misc. 909, 90 N.Y.S.2d 479 (Albany City Ct. 1949).
See, UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw § 98.
LeRoy v. Beard, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 467 (1849); Nelson v. Cowing & Seymour, 6 Hill 336
(N.Y. 1844); Sandford v. Handy, 58 N.Y. (23 Wend.) 259 (1840); Bank of Gresham v. Walch,
76 Ore. 272, 147 Pac. 534 (1915).
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In Alpert v. City Motor Sales24 the court applied the rule of Munn v. Boasberg.25
The court held the payee not to be a holder in due course because a check imports on
its face that the money represented is drawer's property, that the drawer is paying
it to the payee, that a remitter has no apparent title to the check, is to be regarded as
the agent of the drawer; and, when the agent attempts to apply it to a personal debt,
the payee has a duty to inquire and, failing to do so, will be charged with the knowl-
edge, inquiry might have disclosed. 26
One authority has classed Alpert as contrary to the preferred view that payees
may be holders in due course. 27 This observation is perplexing for the case clearly
recognizes the possibility of a payee holding in due course. The court merely asserts
that when a defense is raised the holder has the burden of proving he took title to the
instrument in due course.
In Alpert the drawer, not the payee, was the principal, and for that reason some
courts, in similar fact settings, have rejected the agency related portion of the de-
cision,28 though it remains the law in New York.29 However, when the principal-agent
relationship is between the payee and another, common law rules of agency are ap-
plicable and, if the agent would be barred as a holder in due course, so too will the
payee-principal.30
Saale was decided under the Code, adopted by New York8 ' in 1962. In his opinion
Justice Breitel calls the agency relationship, between the plaintiff and its insurer,
solely a technical one to implement the transfer of plaintiff's nominal ownership.
The court did not deem significant the plaintiff's role in connection with the de-
fendant's request for credit, nor did it give any weight to the plaintiff's control of
the goods and probable retention of title. The majority concluded that the sale was
between the insurer and the defendant and that no one has ever "suggested that be-
ing a party to the underlying transaction bars the holder from being one in due
course."
2
A case relied on, South Shore Securities v. Goode,38 held that under the Code the
payee was a holder in due course, where a builder assigned to a finance company
the right to money owed pursuant to a building contract. There, the obligor's wife
sent a check, designating the finance company payee, to the builder for approval;
the latter forwarded it to his assignee. The builder defaulted; payment was stopped,
but the assignee was allowed to recover from the drawer. Professor Allan Farns-
worth has called the reason for protecting this payee obscure:
"Alpert v. City Motor Sales, Inc., supra note 22.
-292 N.Y. 5, 53 N.E.2d 371 (1944).
"Alpert v. City Motor Sales, Inc., supra note 22, at 910-11, 90 N.Y.S.2d at 480.
2Penney, A Summary Of Articles 3 And 4 And Their Impact In New York, 48 CORNELL
L.Q. 47, 49 & n.13 (1962).
28Wabash Valley Trust Co. v. Fisher, 220 Ind. 133, 41 N.E.2d 352 (1942); Lincoln Trust
Co. v. Birch, 106 N.J.L. 255, 149 At. 120 (1930).
Maber, Inc. v. Factor Cab Corp., 19 App. Div. 2d 500, 244 N.Y.S.2d 768 (1963).
0 Cases cited note 23 supra; Saale v. Interstate Steel Co., supra note 1, at 7, 275 N.Y.S.2d
at 538 (dissenting on other grounds); see BRITTON, op. cit. supra note 7, § 162.
m McKINNEY'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 1-101.
a Saale v. Interstate Steel Co., supra note 1, at 4, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 535.
5 Misc. 2d 972, 162 N.Y.S.2d 962 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
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Since the check was given in payment of a conditional obligation owed by the
obligor directly to the payee and not one owed by the builder to the payee, the
builder was not a remitter . . .4
The justification for protecting the plaintiff in the instant case is equally obscure
if one posits, as the court does, that the sale was between the insurer and the defen-
dant35 and ". .. transmittal of the notes from the buyer to the plaintiff was in dis-
charge of an arrangement between the insurer and insured."36
Juxtaposed to that is Justice Rabin's minority view that the plaintiff was the ven-
dor and the insurer only its agent for whose acts the former is responsible3 7 as at com-
mon law.3 8
The defendant's insistence on either of the court's two views would have seemed
unnecessary to his avoiding summary judgment. Code § 3-305 ennumerates the rights
of a holder in due course-among them is freedom from the defenses of any party to
the instrument with whom he has not dealt; excepted are particularized real de-
fenses.39 Absent a definition of the word "dealt" and articulation of what minimal
contacts are necessary to have so "dealt" with the aggrieved party, an absolute, all-
inclusive interpretation might reasonably be given the word. "Dealt," therefore,
may possibly be thought to include credit checking and releasing goods before the
sale and execution of the note.40 There is indication that the absence of any and all
dealing was the New York Legislature's intention in adopting the Code.41
In addition, after a simple contract defense is shown to exist, the Code explicitly
lodges the burden of establishing due course holding on the party seeking that po-
sition.42 That one is a holder in due course, is not a presumption to be disproven or
called into question by the defendant, as the Saale court suggests. 43 Instead, plain-
tiff "must sustain this burden by affirmative proof that the instrument was taken for
value, that it was taken in good faith, and that it was taken without notice." 44 The
foregoing has been given a literal application by the District of Columbia,
. .. a defense of defective workmanship in the article sold was shown. Appellant
made no attempt to meet the merits of that defense, but sought to avoid the
defense by its claim of being a holder in due course. Under present law the
Farnsworth, COMMERCIAL LAw, 32 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1401, 1404-05 (1957).
Saale v. Interstate Steel Co., supra note 1, at 5, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 535.
Ibid.
87 Id. at 7, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 538.
s Cases cited note 23 supra.
'8 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-305 provides:
To the extent that a holder is a holder in due course he takes the instrument free from
(1) all claims to it on the part of any person; and
(2) all defenses of any party to the instrument with whom the holder has not dealt
except
(real defenses follow).
10 See Peoples Bank v. Haar, 421 P.2d 817 (Okla. 1966).
4 See McKINNEY'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-302 and PRACTICE COMMENTARY. Courts
have relied on the PRACTICE COMMENTARIES. See, e.g., Ando Int'l Ltd. v. Woolmaster Corp., 3
UCC Rptr. 1071 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966).
2MCKINNEY'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-307 (3) and official comment No. 3.
4 Supra note 1, at 4, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 535.
"Official comment cited note 42 supra.
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burden was on appellant to prove that it was "in all respects a holder in due
course."
4 5
Georgia,
... the plaintiff was claiming the rights of a holder in due course, his prima
facie right of action on the note was challenged by the allegation that the de-
fense of failure of consideration exists, which thereby cast the burden on him
"of establishing that he or some person under whom he claims is in all respects
a holder in due course." 46
and other states. 47 In an earlier case under the Code, Justice Breitel wrote that the
plaintiff holder had the burden of showing it was a holder in due course. 48
Recognizing that plaintiff was probably impotent to actually control the insur-
ance company, the court's refusal to find a viable agency relationship is understand-
able, though it is difficult to perceive how the extent of any agency would be realis-
tically discernable without trial. That notwithstanding, the plaintiff, having entered
the negotiations and dealt with the vendee, has made agency unnecessary to the de-
fense. Moreover, in neglecting to finally determine if there was a failure of consid-
eration, the court deprives the defendant of putting the plaintiff to his proof of due
course holding. On the one hand, the decision ignores a defense which would be good
against a mere holder; while, on the other, it says that the defendant failed to show
the plaintiff to be a mere holder. Even if the law did require the defendant to rebut
plaintiff's claim of due course holding, that would be an exercise in futility unless
the court had first determined that there was a defense militating against the claim
of a holder not in due course.
15 United Sec. Corp. v. Bruton, 213 A.2d 892, 894 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
41 Pitillo v. Demetry, 112 Ga. App. 643, 145 S.E.2d 792 (1965).
11 Korzenik v. Supreme Radio, Inc., 347 Mass. 309, 197 N.E.2d 702 (1964); First Pennsyl-
vania Banking & Trust Co. v. DeLise, 186 Pa. Super. 398, 142 A.2d 401 (1958). But cf. Uni-
versal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Ingel, 347 Mass. 119, 196 N.E.2d 847 (1964).
1s Maber, Inc. v. Factor Cab Corp., supra note 29, at 504, 244 N.Y.S.2d at 772. But see
Certified Indus., Inc. v. Monvent, Inc., 2 UCC Rptr. 531 (Sup. Ct. 1965), aff'd mem., 25 App.
Div. 2d 561, 267 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (1966), where the court held it is necessary to specifically deny
that the holder is one in due course.
Constitutional Law-Juvenile Courts-In re Carlo, - N.J. - , 225 A.2d
110 (1967).
ON JUNE 30, 1964, DEBORAH COLEMAN, age ten, was murdered. On July 2, 1964,
Thomas Stasilowitz and Jose Angel Carlo were separately brought to the police sta-
tion for questioning. Stasilowitz was questioned by at least two police officers for ten
consecutive hours, and Carlo was questioned for about seven hours. The question-
ing was stopped after each boy confessed. At the juvenile court proceeding, although
both boys maintained their innocence, the confessions were admitted into evidence,
[Vol. XVI
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and the boys were found to be juvenile delinquents.' On appeal, the primary issue
was the admissibility of the confessions. The Supreme Court of New Jersey, citing
Kent v. United States,2 held that a juvenile proceeding must comply with the consti-
tutional requirement of due process and fair treatment and that the use of an invol-
untary confession violates this requirement.3
The first juvenile court was established in this country in 1897 when the citizenry
became aware of the anomaly of trying juveniles and adults in the same courts.4 The
juvenile courts, as they were first established and still operate, are not criminal courts
but are civil courts, primarily concerned with the welfare and rehabilitation of the
juvenile. A trial in a juvenile court is in the nature of a guardianship proceeding;
the state's role in the proceeding is that of Parens Patriae.5
Since the juvenile proceeding is a civil proceeding, many courts have held that the
juvenile in a juvenile proceeding is not entitled to the constitutional protections af-
forded defendants in a criminal trial.6 The Supreme Court first undertook to study
the possible application of constitutional protection to juveniles in juvenile pro-
ceedings in 1966, some sixty-eight years after the establishment of juvenile court, in
the case of Kent v. United States.7 In Kent, the Court while recognizing that the ju-
venile courts are civil courts which seek to guide and rehabilitate rather than pun-
ish, stated that ".... the admonition to function in a parental relationship is not an
invitation to procedural arbitrariness," 8 and questioned whether the actual opera-
tion of the courts measures well enough against the theory so as to ".. . make toler-
able the immunity of the process from the reach of constitutional guarantees
applicable to adults." 9 The Court, however, specifically declined to apply these con-
stitutional guarantees to juveniles in juvenile proceedings,10 but indicated that
juvenile proceedings must conform to the essentials of due process and fair treat-
ment.11 A clear reading of Kent indicates that the Supreme Court is concerned with
'This opinion was not reported.
383 U.S. 541 (1966).
'In re Carlo, 225 A.2d 110, 116 (1966).
'Gardner, "The Kent Case and the Juvenile Court: A Challenge to Lawyers'; 52 A.B.A.J.
923 (1966).
The Parens Patriae doctrine is based upon the early common law concept of the King as
the ".... ultimate guardian of his subjects, who by reason of helplessness could not help them-
selves" and the juvenile courts are a modern application of this concept as it was adminis-
tered by the English courts of Chancery. Waters, The Socialization of Juvenile Court Proce-
dure, 13 J. CUM. L. C. & P. S. 61, 63 (1922).
" Kent v. United States, supra note 2; In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954); State
v. Naylor, - Del. - , 207 A.2d 1 (1965); Pee v. United States 274 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir.
1959). Among the constitutional rights denied the juvenile have been the right to indictment
by grand jury, to bail, to trial by jury, to immunity against self incrimination, to confron-
tation by his accusers, and in some jurisdictions to the aid of legal counsel. Kent v. United
States, supra note 2. State v. Naylor and Pee v. United States, supra note 6, contain excellent
compilations of cases which deal with denial to the juvenile of many of the specific con-
stitutional privileges enumerated above.
Supra note 2.
81 d. at 555.
9 Ibid.
10 d. at 556.
Id. at 562.
1967]
Catholic University Law Review
the juvenile problem and is ready to hear more cases in this area, as indeed it has
in this term.12
The court in the present case was cognizant of Kent and the problems it raised.
It recognized the weight of authority to the effect that constitutional safeguards are
not applicable to juvenile proceedings, but it was not willing to accept this com-
pletely and, while the court13 recognized that a juvenile may not be entitled to all
the constitutional protections afforded an adult in ,a criminal proceeding, relying
on Kent, it found that, at a minimum, a juvenile is "... entitled to a fact-finding
process which measures up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment."'14 The
court, recognizing the unreliability of involuntary confessions, found that the use of
an involuntary confession fell within the scope of "due process and fair treatment"
and was consequently inadmissible in a juvenile proceeding.'6
A number of other recent cases have followed the lead of Kent and have applied
various constitutional protections to juveniles in juvenile proceedings. Thus, in the
case of In re Two Brothers and a Case of Whiskey, 16 the Juvenile Court of the Dis-
trict of Columbia relied on Kent in applying the exclusionary rule of the fourth and
fifth amendments of the Constitution as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Mapp
v. Ohio.17 Again, in People v. Roberts'8 and In re Castro,'9 two other courts found
that the "due process and fair treatment" criteria of Kent requireb that the juvenile
must be informed of his immunity against self incrimination and that evidence ob-
tained without so informing him is inadmissible in juvenile courts.2 0 Another court
has relied on Kent in finding that evidence obtained from a juvenile when he was in
custody of the juvenile court was obtained when he was denied constitutional pro-
tection, and was therefore inadmissible in subsequent criminal proceedings. 21 Kent
has also been relied on to support the use of an insanity plea in a juvenile
proceeding.22
However, the use of Kent to support a juvenile's right to effective assistance of
counsel 23 and to a jury trial has been rejected by other courts. 24 In a case presenting
an issue similar to one raised in Kent, the denial of a waiver hearing, whereby a ju-
venile was waived from the juvenile court to a criminal court, was upheld despite
the fact that Kent found that such a denial was not "due process." 25
"In re Gault, 99 Ariz. 181,407 P.2d 760 (1965), cert. granted, (No. 116, 1966 Term). Appel-
lant Gault in his brief relies on the Kent case and presents issues basic to the Constitution
and the juvenile courts, such as the right against self-incrimination.
"State v. Carlo, supra note 3, at 115-16.
4ld. at 116.
"Ibid.
a0Juv. Ct. Numbers 66-2652J & 66-2653J. December 29, 1966, 95 Washington Law Rptr. 113.
17367 U.S. 643 (1961).
183 Mich. App. 537, 143 N.W.2d 182 (1966).
1964 Cal. 2d 467, 52 Cal. Rptr. 469 (1966).
0 The courts in these cases applied the Supreme Court's rulings in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), to juveniles in juvenile proceed-
ings.
C1Gercas v. Davis, 188 So. 2d. 7 (Fla. 1966).
"In re Winburn, - Wis. -, 145 N.W.2d 178 (1966).
"Jackson v. Johnson, 364 F.2d 233 (6th Cir. 1966). State v. Bowling, - Ore.
413 P.2d 421 (1966).
2In re Elmore, 222 A.2d 255 (1966).
2Dillenburg v. Maxwell, - Wash. - , 413 P.2d 940 (1966).
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While it is impossible to establish a trend developing from the cases which have
been decided since Kent, it can be said that Kent has stirred up a healthy contro-
versy. Until Kent, the inapplicability of constitutional protections to a juvenile in
junvenile proceedings was virtually a settled question; now the courts are being
called upon to reconsider their decisions and, for those courts inclined to apply con-
stitutional protection to juveniles in juvenile proceedings, Kent provides a convinc-
ing precedent.
Recognizing that juveniles were entitled to constitutional protections prior to the
adoption of the juvenile court acts; 26 that adults who are before the juvenile courts
must be accorded constitutional protections; 27 and that juveniles who are tried in a
criminal trial must be given all the constitutional protections accorded adults in
criminal proceedings,28 it becomes even more unacceptable that these constitutional
protections are denied juveniles in juvenile proceedings. It is granted that all con-
stitutional protections afforded in criminal trials may not be applicable to juvenile
proceedings because of the informal nature of the proceedings and the individual
attention afforded the juvenile. Thus, the denial of a jury trial as in the Elmore29
case might be justified because of the confidential nature of the juvenile hearing.8 0
However, the effective right to counsel3' and to a "hearing upon waiver" from a ju-
venile court32 would seem to be among the essentials of due process and fair treat-
ment and should not be denied.33
The inadmissibility of involuntary confessions in a juvenile court, as recognized
by the court in the instant case, is perhaps one of the most important constitutional
protections which should be afforded a juvenile. The protection is important not
only because the juvenile would have this specific protection in a criminal court 34
but also because of the susceptibility of a youth to police pressure. As the court rec-
ognized in the present case, "Boys of 13 and 15 lack the judgment to appreciate ...
the harm which they may do themselves by yielding to the pressures of insistent po-
lice questioning." 35 In addition, juveniles do not normally have the maturity and
judgment to understand the ramifications of the questions presented or to appreciate
how best to avail themselves of their rights.36 It is imperative that an involuntary
Antieau, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CORNELL L. Q. 387 (1961). Cases
cited therein: Commonwealth v. Horcegan, 127 Mass. 450 (1879); State ex rel. Cunningham v.
Ray, 63 N.H. 406 (1885); People ex rel. O'Connell v. Turrin, 55 Ill. 280 (1870).
United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433 (1922).
Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
In re Elmore, supra note 24.
30 Barrett, Brown, & Cramer, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individ-
ualized Justice, 79 HARV. L. REv. 775, 794 (1966).
t1Jackson v. Johnson, supra note 23.
12 Dillenburg v. Maxwell, supra note 25.
8 In reviewing the denial of counsel and a hearing under the District of Columbia
Juvenile Court Act, the Court in Kent said: "The right to representation by counsel is not
a formality. It is not a grudging jesture to a ritualistic requirement. It is of the essence of
justice. Appointment of counsel without affording an opportunity for a hearing on a
'critically important' decision [waiver] is tantamount to denial of counsel." Kent v. United
States, supra note 2, at 562.
" Gallegas v. Colorado, supra note 28; Haley v. Ohio, supra note 28.
8 In re Carlo, supra, note 3, at 119.
06 Gallegas v. Colorado, supra note 28, at 54.
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confession be banned from a junvenile proceeding, for it is difficult to imagine a
greater injustice than the imprisonment of a juvenile for a crime he did not commit
on the basis of a confession obtained in part because of his very youth.3 7
The Constitution is intended to prevent miscarriages of justice and procedural
arbitrariness; the juvenile, who is often not represented by counsel,38 is in grave need
of these protections. This was best stated by Justice Fortas in Kent when he said,
"There is evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds for concern that the child re-
ceives the worst of both worlds that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults
nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatments postulated for children.' 3 9
The question of the applicability of constitutional protections to juveniles in ju-
venile proceedings is most important, in retrospect, when it is realized that the end
result of a juvenile proceeding and a criminal trial are often the same, i.e., imprison-
ment. The courts and the judges may talk in lofty terms about the juvenile proceed-
ings, and state that they are directed to the proper care, guidance, custody and dis-
cipline of the child, and not, as in a criminal trial, to his guilt or innocence as a
criminal offender.40 But, when a juvenile is sent to reform school for "rehabilitation,"
he is deprived of his freedom and restrained against his will just as is any other crim-
inal offender; and this is the real issue.
17 As a general rule, no appellate court will uphold the conviction of a juvenile in a
juvenile court solely on the basis of a coerced confession, but the standard applied in a
juvenile court is guilty, not beyond a reasonable doubt, but only by a preponderence of
evidence, and there is always the danger that the findings of the juvenile court may have
been influenced by the use of the confession in evidence. See Comment, Criminal Offenders
in the Juvenile Courts, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 1171, 1181-84 (1966).
8Surveys indicate that the representation by attorneys in juvenile cases may be as low
as 5%, Barrett, Brown, & Cramer, supra note 30, at 796. In the District of Columbia, for
example, lawyers are requested or appear in 10 to 15% of the cases. Report of the President's
Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia, 681-82.
Kent v. United States, supra note 2, at 556.
,
0Waters, supra note 5. Dillenburg v. Maxwell, supra note 25. One of the most quoted refu-
tations to this position is the statement of a California court, "While the juvenile court law
provides the adjudication of a minor to be a ward of the court shall not be deemed to be a
conviction of a crime, nevertheless, for all practical purposes this is a legel fiction, presenting
a challenge to credulity and doing violence to reason." In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787,
241 P.2d 631 (1952).
Domestic Relations-Custody of Infants-Jurisdiction of Probate Courts-
Green v. 'Green, -Mass.-, 221 N.E.2d 857 (1966).
MR. & MRS. WALTER GREEN had been separated for some time prior to 1965, both
remaining in the state of their original domicile, Massachusetts. In February of 1965,
the husband was transferred by his employer to Danville, Illinois, where he has
since resided. The two minor children of the couple remained with their mother at
her residence in Pittsfield, Massachusetts until June of 1965, when the husband's
mother took the children, without the consent or knowledge of the mother, to live
with their father. Mrs. Green filed a petition for separate support on June 23, 1965,
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seeking, among other things, an order for the "care, custody and maintenance of
the children." A citation was issued on the same day and later served on the husband
personally while he was in Massachusetts. The husband appeared specially, contest-
ing the jurisdiction of the probate court. The judge denied the plea but reserved to
the Supreme Judicial Court the final determination of the question of whether the
probate court has jurisdiction to make an order' relative to the care, custody, and
maintenance of minor children when the parents are both subject to the court's
jurisdiction but the children themselves are resident and domiciled in another state.
In affirming denial of the plea, the court held that personal jurisdiction is a sufficient
basis for jurisdiction, regardless of the residence or domicile of the children.2
The husband supported his plea of lack of jurisdiction on two main grounds. His
first contention was based upon an interpretation of the "twin" sections providing
for the care and support of minor children of separated parents-sections 32 and 37
of chapter 29.3 Since both sections are closely allied, and have been used alternatively
at times,4 the husband contended that the jurisdiction requirement of 37 must neces-
sarily apply to 32. The court dismissed this rather easily by noting that the provision
for jurisdiction of section 37 is really in the nature of a venue clause. Since, the court
concluded, section 32 has its own venue requirement different from that of section
375 the interpretation suggested by the husband would lead to the rather anomolous
result that there are two different venue requirements for the same provisionl
The husband's second contention was that in custody proceedings, the jurisdic-
tion of the probate court must be based upon either the domicile or residence of
the children within the Commonwealth. In passing on this point, the court first ex-
amined the cases decided under section 32. The two major cases are cited by the
court: Schmidt v. Schmidt6 and Conley v. Conley,7 both of which held that either
domicile or residence were sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the ocurt. However,
neither case held that domicile or residence were exclusive prerequisites of jurisdic-
tion. In fact, continued the court, in the Conley case it was held: "We need not con-
sider whether the decree can be supported on other grounds."8 Thus, the court did
' Pursuant to G.L. c. 209, section 32.
2 Green v. Green, - Mass. -, 221 N.E. 857 (1966).
3 Section 32: Support of Wife and Children; Order Prohibiting Personal Restraint of
Other Spouse; Custody of Children; Investigations:
Upon the application of the husband or wife, the court can make further orders relative
to the support of the wife and the care, custody and maintenance of their minor
children...
Section 37: Minor Children of Separated Parents; Care and Custody:
If the parents of minor children live apart from each other, not being divorced, the
probate court for the county in which said minors or any of them are residents or in-
habitants, shall have the power to make decrees relative to their care, education and
maintenance, and to revise and alter such decree.
I Marshall v. Marshall, 236 Mass. 248, 128 N.E. 27 (1920).
5 Section 34: Venue:
A petition under section 32 may be brought in the county where either of the parties
lives, except that if the petitioner has left the county where the parties have lived to-
gether and the respondent still lives therein, the petition shall be brought in that county.
6280 Mass. 216, 182 N.E. 374 (1932).
324 Mass. 530, 87 N.E.2d 153 (1949).
8Id. at 532, 87 N.E.2d at 155.
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not feel constrained to follow precedent and proceeded to investigate the general
rules governing the jurisdiction of the probate court in such custody cases with the
hope of formulating its own rule.
From the earliest time infants were regarded as entitled to the special protection
of the state, which acted as "parens patriae." 9 Thus, there is no doubt that a state is
authorized to legislate for the protection, care, custody and maintenance of children
within its jurisdiction.10 Independently of any statute," however, the custody of mi-
nor children is a subject of which a court of equity will take cognizance in a proper
case. The problem arises when there are two equity courts which have an interest in
the child. It then becomes necessary to determine exactly what requirements are
needed to give a court of equity jurisdiction to adjudicate the custody of the infants.
Essentially three theories have developed as to what is necessary to confer jurisdic-
tion on a court in such custody cases. 12 The traditional rule relative to these cases is
that in order for the court to have jurisdiction, the children must be domiciled with-
in the state where the proceedings are brought. Such a view, while followed by some
courts, 1 3 is favored mostly by the writers. 14 The rationale given by the proponents of
this theory is expressed by the Supreme Court of Florida in Dorman v. Friendly:'5
The subject matter involved in the question.., is the children themselves, and,
if a court does not have jurisdiction of them, it does not have jurisdiction of the
subject matter to determine the right of custody ... 1
Domicile is, however, a very technical concept and wrought with complexities. This
led the more practical courts to adopt a somewhat more flexible basis for jurisdic-
tion-residency.17 Justice Cardozo eloquently rejected the domicile standard for juris-
diction and adopted the test of residency: "It [the state's jurisdiction] has its origin
in the protection that is due to the incompetent or helpless. For this, the residence
of the child suffices though the domicile be elsewhere."'18 This result has gained favor
with the courts and is accepted by a majority of them. Indeed, as the court pointed
out, Massachusetts had adhered to this view.19
Even this expansion has been considered too narrow a basis for jurisdiction and
some courts have gone further and extended jurisdiction in those cases where the
court has in personam jurisdiction over the parents. 20 This theory is illustrated by
the excellent opinion of Judge Traynor in the landmark case of Sampsell v. Superior
Court of Los Angeles County.21 In that case the parents were both subject to the
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bangs, 103 U.S. 435 (1880).
10 Hersey v. Hersey, 271 Mass. 545, 171 N.E. 815 (1930).
Urbach v. Urbach, 52 Wyo. 207, 73 P.2d 953 (1937).
See, Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 7 (1949).
"In re: Guardianship of Skinner, 230 Iowa 1016, 300 N.W. 1 (1941).
14 See BALE, CONFLICT OF LAws § 144.3 (1929); GOODRICH, CONFUCT OF LAWS § 136 (3d
ed. 1949).
1146 Fla. 732, 1 So. 2d 734 (1941).
10 Id. at 734, 1 So. 2d at 736.
17 Richter v. Harmon, 243 N.C. 373, 90 S.E.2d 744 (1956).
18 Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925).
" Schmidt v. Schmidt, supra note 6.
"Stephens v. Stephens, 53 Idaho 427, 24 P.2d 52 (1933); Anderson v. Anderson, 74 W. Va.
124, 81 S.E. 706 (1914).
1 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948).
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court's jurisdiction and the child was domiciled in California, although not a resi-
dent there. The court did not take the easy escape of domicile but held:
It is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction that the state has a substantial interest in
the welfare of the child or in the preservation of the family unit of which he is a
part.22
It is difficult to imagine any broader language conferring jurisdiction on a court.
Certainly any state can claim such "substantial interest."
The approach taken by the California court seems to have found the immediate
support of a growing number of state courts. 23 Although the courts differ among
themselves as to why they adopt the "California theory," the basic ideas of Judge
Traynor are present, especially the one giving the court jurisdiction if there is a
substantial interest. These recurrent themes are well illustrated by the decision of
the Missouri Court of Appeals in the 1960 case of Weiler v. Weiler:24
It appears logical that the court having jurisdiction over both parents should
have jurisdiction to determine and award custody of the children. A multiplicity
of suits would otherwise result and the "best interest" of the children would not
thereby be served.26
Similar results have been reached by the courts of: Alaska,26 Nevada, 27 New Mexico, 28
South Carolina,29 and Illinois.3 0
After a thorough review of the authorities and possibilities open to it, the Supreme
Judicial Court in Green decided to adopt the rule expounded by the California
court. While realizing that the ideal situation for determining custody is when the
children, as well as both parents, are in the presence of the court, the court admitted
that such a situation is often difficult or impossible to achieve. Thus, the presence of
both parents will afford a reasonable opportunity for this determination-at least as
reasonable as the presence of one parent with the child (under the resident require-
ment) or one parent alone (under the domicile requirement).
The result reached by the court seems to be desirable from two points of view.
Under the domicile theory, a court could have jurisdiction to determine the custody
of minor children when in fact onily the father is domiciled in that state, since the
place of the father's domicile, is legally that of the children also.3' One party is cer-
tainly not sufficient for a valid adjudication of the child's life. Residency would seem
a little more equitable since only one party may be before the court, even though
the child is present. It is not essential that the children themselves be before the
court but it would seem essential that both parties involved would be, since the de-
cision and award of the court will have the greatest effect upon them. The court's
Id. at 774, 197 P.2d at 750.
2 Annot., supra note 12, 30-32.
24331 S.W. 2d 165 (Mo. App. 1966).
24Id. at 168.
Burgo v. Burgo, 17 Alaska 84, 149 F. Supp. 932 (1957).
Wilson v. Wilson, 66 Nev. 405, 212 P.2d 1066 (1949).
2Wallace v. Wallace, 63 N.M. 414, 320 P.2d 1020 (1958).
2 Jackson v. Jackson, 241 S.C. 1, 126 S.E.2d 855 (1962).
80In re Guardianship of Smythe, 65 Ill. 2d 431, 213 N.E.2d 609 (1965).
11 Glass v. Glass, 260 Mass. 562, 157 N.E. 621 (1929).
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decision in Green is a realistic one, regarding the children not as mere property,
which must be within the state for an in rem proceeding,8 2 but as true objects of their
concern-the state is truly acting as "parens patriae." The second reason why the
court's decision seems desirable is that it may work to avoid a multiplicity of suits.33
By attaining personal jurisdiction over both parents and settling all the problems in
one litigation, it would certainly be in the best interest of all the parties.
Finally, it must be admitted that the decision of the court is in line with the recent
trend of expanding a court's jurisdiction over subject matter traditionally denied
to it. Thus, the Green decision may be to the law of domestic relations what the Inter-
national Shoe3 4 decision was to contracts and what the Kilberg3 5 decision was to torts.
a' Dorman v. Friendly, supra note 15.
8 See Wilson v. Wilson, supra note 27.
' 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
89 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E. 2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 733 (1961).
Federal Procedure-Intervention of Right in Antitrust Litigation-Cascade
Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 35 U.S.L. WEEK 4227 (Feb.
27, 1967).
DIVESTITURE WITHOUT DELAY WAS THE MANDATE handed down by the Supreme Court
nearly three years ago' in their holding that the acquisition of Pacific Northwest
Corp. by El Paso Natural Gas Co. violated section 7 of the Clayton Act.2 During the
three years since that decision, the district court has approved negotiations among
the Department of Justice,3 El Paso, and the new company, which will not restore the
new company to the position of competition once held by Pacific Northwest Corp.
In this respect the Department of Justice "knuckled under" 4 to El Paso. Appellants,
the State of California, Southern California Edison (a large industrial user of
natural gas in the state of California) and Cascade Natural Gas (a distributor in
Washington and Oregon), seek intervention as of right under Rule 24 (a) (3) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, desiring the retention of competition in Califor-
nia.5 The Court holds that California as well as Southern California Edison may in-
tervene because they are " 'so situated' geographically as to be 'adversely affected'
within the meaning of Rule 24 (a) (3) by a merger that reduces the competitive factor
United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
2Clayton Act § 7, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), amending 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
8 Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 35 U.S.L. WEEK 4227, 4229 (Feb.
27, 1967). In laying down the guidelines for establishing the new company, the Court points
out that the Federal Power Commission has not had the opportunity to pass upon the con-
tract. The Federal Power Commission ". . . indicated its approval of this merger as being in
the public interest." United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., supra note 1, at 663. For a
provocative comment on the element of dual control existing between the Justice Depart-
ment and the Federal Power Commission, see Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in United States
v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., supra note 1, at 664.
'Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., supra note 3, at 4231.
LId. at 4228.
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in natural gas available to California."6 The Court did not decide whether Cascade
may intervene, since de novo hearings were ordered and a new version of Rule 24 (a)
came in effect as of July 1, 1966; this version was not in effect at the time of the dis-
trict court's denial of intervention.7
Rule 24 (a), governing intervention of right, is as follows:
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted
to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers an
unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the representation of the appli-
cant's interest by existing parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant is
or may be bound by a judgment in the action; or (3) when the applicant is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of
property which is in the custody or subject to the control or disposition of the
court or an officer thereof.8 (Emphasis added.)
Courts have differed in the interpretation of "interest" necessary for intervention as
of right under 24 (a) (2).9 The phrase "may be bound," also in 24 (a) (2), has been
interpreted to mean bound in a res judicata sense.10 Because the judgment in a gov-
ernment antitrust action is not res judicata in private antitrust actions,1 l none of
the applicants can intervene under 24 (a) (2).
Intervention in government antitrust suits has been constantly denied because of
the underlying rationale that the United States alone can represent the public in-
terest.12 Statutory power is in the Attorney General to prosecute violators.'8 Private
parties would only cause added delay in already prolonged litigation, by asserting
their view of the public interest. Since antitrust litigation is inherently protracted,
courts have been reluctant to grant intervention under Rule 24 (a) (3).14
As a practical matter, an individual cannot spend a vast amount of time and
money litigating an issue that has already been decided, and for this reason some
courts have recognized the injustice in not permitting a private party to intervene.
Thus the different interpretations of "interest" in 24 (a) (2). Some courts have
found the concept of property in a secret formula.' 5 These developments are a nat-
0 Id. at 4229.
7 Supreme Court Order of February 28, 1966, 384 U.S. 1031 (1966). The new version of
the rules applies ". . . also in all further proceedings in actions then pending, except to the
extent that in the opinion of the Court their application in a particular action then pend-
ing would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former procedure
applies."
8 FED. R. Civ. P. 24 (a).
9 Smith v. Gale, 144 U.S. 509 (1892); cf. Radford Iron Co. v. Appalachian Elec. Power
Co., 62 F.2d 940 (4th Cir. 1933).
10 Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 336 U.S. 683 (1961). See generally 15 VAND.
L. REv. 647 (1962).
11 Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, supra note 10. Here intervention as of right
was denied in a government antitrust suit against a music association of which applicant
Sam Fox was a member. Theoretically Fox could bring his own antitrust action, but prac-
tically this was almost impossible.
12 Buckeye Coal & Ry. v. Hocking Valley Ry., 269 U.S. 42 (1925).
13 62 Stat. 909 (1948), 15 U.S.C. §§ 4, 25 (1964).
"This seems to be the main concern of the dissent in Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El
Paso Natural Gas Co., supra note 3.15 Formulabs, Inc. v. Hartley Pen Co., 275 F.2d 52 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 830
(1960). See, 4 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 24.09 (3), at 55 (2d ed. 1962).
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ural result of the technical rigidity enveloped in 24 (a).O In the new version of
Rule 24 (a), which will be in effect when this case again visits the district court, the
technical concepts embodied in the old Rule 24 (a) have been eliminated. It states
that a party may intervene:
. .. when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction
which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of
the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that
interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing
parties. 17 (Emphasis added.)
This is very liberal in relation to the old rule previously mentioned. The infusion
of such phrases as "relating to,"'S "property or transaction,'U9 and "as a practical
matter"20 provides a very flexible rule. Notice must be given to the last phrase of the
new version: ".. . unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by exist-
ing parties"; 21 the key to intervention in the future, was formally embodied only in
Rule 24 (a) (2).
Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co, is decided in the spirit of
the new version of Rule 24 (a) as well as in the spirit of Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line
Co. v. United States,22 although the former case's interpretation is classified accord-
ing to the old Rule 24 (a).23
In Missouri Pipe, intervention, as of right, was allowed, however it was not de-
pendent on Rule 24 (a). Here, a consent decree had been entered providing that, on
application, Panhandle Eastern, a competitor of the defendant, might become a
party to the litigation in order to protect its interests. 24 Five years later the govern-
ment decided to reopen the decree and a security holder of Panhandle Eastern was
allowed to intervene as of right. Intervention was allowed outside of the provisions
of Rule 24 (a) only because Panhandle's right to intervene was expressly established
in the consent decree itself,25 thus, in no way dependent on Rule 24 (a). The eco-
nomic independence of Panhandle in Missouri Pipe2c and the economic independ-
" See 1966 Advisory Committee's note on revision of Rule 24 (a).
17 FED. R. Civ. P. 24 (a) (2) effective as mentioned supra note 7.
'1It is questionable whether Cascade has an interest "in" California competition, but
certainly it has an interest "relating to."
'" This revision eliminates the difficulty of obtaining a just decision as in Formulabs, Inc.
v. Hartley Pen Co., supra note 15, which was decided under the old rule.
m In Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, supra note 10, as "a practical matter," for
a private individual to prosecute an antitrust action, is by far the exception. Perhaps, if the
new version of the Rule were used, the Court would have reached a different result.2t Supra note 7.
2 312 U.S. 502 (1941).
The Court specifically points out that the new version will be used when the case goes
back to the District Court for de novo hearings. Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso
Natural Gas Co., supra note 3, at 4229.
", Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v. United States, supra note 22, n.1 at 507 (expressly
giving Panhandle Eastern certain rights). See 40 MICH. L. REv. 146 n.12 (1941), which posits
that the case must be construed very narrowly, and states "A corporation in the position
of Panhandle in the principal case would have no absolute right of intervention under the
federal rules."
25 Ibid.
20 d. at 506.
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ence of California in El Paso27 formed the heart of the controversies. Thus, in as-
similating a divestiture decree issued almost three years ago, the Court finds a close
analogy to rights derived from a five year old consent decree, and the "spirit" of
Missouri Pipe is adhered to.
In Cascade Justices Stewart and Harlan dissent, stating "... nothing could be bet-
ter calculated to confuse and prolong antitrust litigation than the rule which the
Court today announces."28 While it is true that the Court did take a liberal view of
intervention, the rule it used, because it is now supplanted by a new version, is a
mere nullity.
Because the Department of Justice "knuckled under" and the district court ap-
proved contracts which would saddle "onerous prices and other conditions on the
new company,"29 thus leading the Court to remove the District Judge,30 the neces-
sary element of inadequate representation was fulfilled which will satisfy all of the
elements of the new Rule 24 (a). Intervention will perhaps be more frequent in the
future under Rule 24 (a); but, it will not unduly protract antitrust litigation. Delay
will only be caused when there is a violation of the last phrase of the new
rule " . . . unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing par-
ties."31 Certainly a jurisprudential quagmire would result if intervention had no
limit, but adequate representation provides such a limit. Cascade could not have
intervened under the new Rule 24 (a) if the Department of Justice had been acting
with due regard to the mandate of the Supreme Court. 2
Upon the admittance of Cascade and the other appellants, the individual con-
sumer of natural gas in California will again be adequately represented, thus inter-
vention will be denied. Under the new Rule 24 (a), all parties that fulfill the re-
quirements will be represented, and the least amount of delay necessary to accom-
plish a just result will be achieved.
It is submitted that the cases discussed below will prove to be valuable guidelines
for intervention in the future. In Wolpe v. Poretsky33 a Zoning Commission brought
suit to enforce its zoning order for the benefit of adjoining property owners. "At the
close of a trial on the merits the court found that the action of the Zoning Commis-
sion in adopting the zoning order in question was arbitrary, capricious and void." 4
The Zoning Commission decided not to appeal the decision. The adjoining prop-
erty owners applied to intervene. The court held:
The failure of the Zoning Commission to take an appeal dearly indicates that
its representation of the interest of the interveners was inadequate. We do not
go so far as to hold that adequate representation requires an appeal in every
21 Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., supra note 3, at 4229.
's Id. at 4233 (dissenting opinion).
2Id. at 4228.
811d. at 4231. Cf. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954); Cooke v. United States, 267
U.S. 517 (1925); in both cases dismissal was ordered on the basis of the record.
"Supra note 8.
In Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., supra note 3, at 4229 the
Court states: ". . . we conclude that the new Rule 24 (a) (2) is broad enough to include
Cascade also; and as we shall see the 'existing parties' have fallen far short of representing
its interests."
144 F.2d 505 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 777 (1944).
Id. at 506.
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case. But here an administrative body is charged with arbitrary and capricious
action in favor of a strong presumption that they properly performed their
duties. 5
Intervention was allowed only when it was determined that inadequate representa-
tion existed. This result is similar to results which probably will be reached under
the new Rule 24 (a).
In citing Wolpe, Pallegrine v. Nesbit3 6 allowed a stockholder who owned but two
shares of stock to intervene when his corporation refused to appeal an adverse judg-
ment brought to recover profits against the corporation's officers obtained from a
stock purchase agreement. The court held "Intervention should be allowed even
after a final judgment where it is necessary to preserve some right which cannot oth-
erwise be protected.... In the instant case appellant had no right to intervene so
long as the corporation was diligently prosecuting the action."3 7 Before failure to ap-
peal, intervention would not have been allowed.
Cascade v. El Paso is an unusual case in the respect that it is couched in the lan-
guage of a rule which, because of the new version, is a nullity. The issues it presents
are moot since old Rule 24 (a) is supplanted, but its reasoning does present valu-
able insights into intervention in the future. Intervention of right was properly
granted, couched in the language of an obsolete rule, but in the "spirit" of Missouri
Pipe and with foresight relating to future litigation under the new Rule 24 (a) (2).
MId. at 507.
"203 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1953).
8Id. at 465-66.
Federal Income Taxation-Tax Accounting-Customer Advances for the
Sale of Goods Not Shipped Included in Income of the Year of Receipt-
Hagan Advertising Displays, Inc. v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. No. 13 (Nov. 18,
1966).
HAGAN ADvERTISING DIsPLAys, Inc. is a manufacturer of dealer identification signs
for national advertisers. In attempting to forecast their needs for signs a year in ad-
vance, the advertisers placed blanket orders with Hagan for the number of signs
which their estimates showed would be needed in the ensuing year. Although nor-
mally these orders reflected a year's needs, on some occasions their budgets were in-
accurate or orders were placed for more than a year. In such instances shipments of
signs under the blanket orders would-extend over a period longer than a year, some-
times two or three years. Some of Hagan's customers made payments on their con-
tracts in advance of shipment. In computing taxable income for the year Hagan
would include only so much of the advance payments as were evidenced by signs
shipped to the purchasers. Advance payments included in the "advances from cus-
tomers" account as of the end of any year were removed from that account and cred-
[Vol. xvi
Case Notes
ited to sales in the subsequent year, or years, in which Hagan delivered the signs for
which the advances had been paid.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed a deficiency' for two taxable
years, noting that Hagan's taxable income should be increased by the amount of
the advances received during those years. The Tax Court agreed with the Commis-
sioner 2 and held: that the Commissioner had acted within his discretionary limits in
denying the deferral of the advances to subsequent years to more clearly reflect in-
come.
Although initially the claim of right doctrine3 was relied upon as a bar to deferral
of advances by accrual basis taxpayers, recently the courts have concentrated less on
this approach. 4
In Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissionerr5 the taxpayer sought to defer
dues income over a twelve month period, one-twelfth of the dues received being rec-
ognized as income each month. The dues were deposited in a general bank account
with no restrictions on use. The Commissioner argued that since the dues were re-
ceived under a claim of right without restriction as to disposition, the entire amount
should be reported as income in the year received. The Court, in holding for the
Commissioner, skirted the claim of right argument and held only that the pro-rata
allocation of membership dues in monthly amounts was purely artificial and bore no
relation to the services which petitioner might be called upon to render.6
In Bressner Radio, Inc. v. Commissioner,7 the court pointed out that although sec-
tion 41 of the Code s provided for net income to be determined on an annual basis,
the exception provided in section 429 would allow deferral of prepaid income if,
under an accounting method allowed under section 41, the amounts were to be
properly accounted for as of a different period.' 0 Therefore, the court held, the tax-
1 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 446 (b). INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 481 (a).
'47 T.C. No. 13 (Nov. 18, 1966), CCH 1966 TAX CT. REP. 2954.
"If a taxpayer receives earnings under a claim of right and without restriction as to its
disposition, he has received income which he is required to return, even though it may still
be claimed that he is not entitled to retain the money, and even though he may still be
adjudged liable to restore its equivalent." North American Consolidated Oil Co. v. Burnet,
286 U.S. 417,424 (1932). See Curtis R. Andrews v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 1026 (1955) (prepaid
tuition for dancing lessons); South Dade Farms v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1943)
(rent received in advance); Clay Sewer Pipe Ass'n v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 130 (3d Cir.
1943) (subscription for promotion campaign to be consummated in years subsequent to
receipt). The Tax Court has carried the claim of right doctrine to the point where it was
found applicable to advance fees which were due but not yet paid. Your Health Club, Inc.,
4 T.C. 385 (1944).
Automobile Club of New York v. Commissioner, 304 F.2d 781 (2d Cir. 1962); Simplified
Tax Records, Inc., 41 T.C. 75 (1963); Chester Farrara, 44 T.C. 189 (1965).
'353 U.S. 180 (1957).
'Id. at 189. The Court distinguished Beacon Pub. Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 697 (10th
Cir. 1955) (prepaid newspaper subscriptions) and Schuessler v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 722
(5th Cir. 1956) (customer advances to cover cost of turning furnaces on and off over several
year period) on their facts. In both cases performance was necessarily postponed by the nature
of the enterprise. Therefore, deferral was warranted.
7 267 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1959).
a INT. REV. CODE of 1939, § 41.
9 INT. REV. CODE of 1939, § 42.
10 Taxpayer was engaged in the sale of television receivers, had long employed the accrual
method of accounting and sold twelve month servicing contracts for which it received lump
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payer's method of accounting did clearly reflect income inasmuch as the taxpayer
took into income of the year such portion of the total as, in accordance with its ac-
counting procedures, it then considered to be earned." The court distinguished
Automobile Club of Michigan by noting that the Supreme Court had held for the
Commissioner on the narrow ground that pro-rata allocation of membership dues
in monthly installments was purely artificial.12
However, in American Automobile Association v. Commissioner,13 the rationale in
Bressner was rejected.' 4 Notwithstanding expert accounting testimony to the effect
that the method used was in accord with generally accepted accounting principles,
the Court held that for tax purposes the system of accounting was "purely artificial"
since the performance of the services was contingent upon member demand and not
related to fixed dates after the tax year.15 The Court also held that although the
method used conformed to generally accepted accounting principles for performing
the function of business accounting, representing a rather accurate image of total
financial structure, it nevertheless failed to respect the criteria of annual tax ac-
counting and was not conclusive on the issue of clearly reflecting income.16 That be-
ing the case, the Commissioner had not breached his discretion in disallowing de-
ferral.17 Moreover, the retroactive repeal of sections 4521s and 462?,9 the Court found,
sum payments. Taxpayer, in accordance with the method of accounting regularly employed
in keeping its books, allocated 25% of the service contract price to installation cost and
deferred the balance over the twelve month period of the contract. Bressner Radio, Inc. v.
Commissioner, supra note 7, at 521.
11 Ibid.
"Therefore, as the court found a "realistic" deferral, clearly reflecting income, the Com-
missioner's discretion was nullified. Id. at 526.
"367 U.S. 687 (1961).
"'Certiorari was granted because of the conflict between Bressner and the Court of Claims
decision in American Automobile. Id. at 689.
1 Id. at 691.
16 Id. at 692-93.
1 Historically, the Commissioner has been given wide latitude in determining the com-
putation of net income. See Lucas v. American Code Co., 280 U.S. 445, 449 (1930) wherein it
was stated, "And the direction that net income be computed according to the method of
accounting regularly employed by the taxpayer is expressly limited to cases where the Com-
missioner believes that the accounts clearly reflect income. Much latitude for discretion is
thus given to the administrative board charged with the duty of enforcing the [revenue] Act.
Its interpretation of the statute and the practice adopted by it should not be interfered with
unless clearly unlawful." Accord, Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 193 (1934); Commissioner
v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446 (1959). But see, Pacific Grape Products, Co. v. Commissioner, 219
F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1955) (deduction case) wherein Commissioner's holding that no sales of
unshipped fruit products had been made, thus allowing taxpayer less deduction for cost of
goods sold, reversed, on the ground that usage and custom in regard to standard contracts
used throughout the industry warranted finding of passage of title.
It has been noted that in light of the courts' recent decisions, the Commissioner's discretion
seemingly has been eliminated. Alvin, Tax Court Extends Prepaid Income Rules to Sales of
Goods; New Tax Headaches for Many, 23 J. TAXATION 210, 211 (1965).
"' INT. REV. CODE of 1954, ch. 1, § 452, 68A Stat. 152. This section specifically provided for
deferral of prepaid income by accrual basis taxpayers.
'
0 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, ch. 1, § 462, 68A Stat. 158. This section specifically provided for
reserves for estimated expenses to be taken into account in computing taxable income by
accrual basis taxpayers.
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was clearly a mandate from Congress that petitioner's system of accounting was not
acceptable for tax purposes. 20
In reaching its decision, the court in Hagan relied on the underlying rationale
of American Automobile and Schlude.2 ' The fact that the advance payments were
for goods rather than services, the court found, did not render those decisions in-
applicable. 22 Although noting that not all receipts of money or property constitute
part of his gross or taxable income,23 the court found the advances includible in tax-
able income on the grounds that they were received for firm orders without restric-
tion as to use. 24 Money thus received, the court held, was for sales in the ordinary
course of business.25
However, under the regulations applicable to producers of goods, the use of in-
ventories is mandatory to determine taxable income.26 Merchandise is to be included
in inventory only if title is vested in the taxpayer, and excluded from inventory
where the goods have been sold.27 An accrual method taxpayer engaged in a manu-
facturing business may account for sales of his product when the goods are shipped,
when the product is delivered, or when title passes to the customer.28 Hagan, then, in
deferring recognition of income until the signs were ordered delivered by its cus-
tomers, seemingly was in accord with the statutory guidelines applicable to businesses
of its type.
Yet the court held that to allow Hagan to wait until the goods were shipped so
that the cost of goods sold could be subtracted from gross ieceipts would, in effect,
be placing it on a "transactional" 29 basis of accounting.3 0 Further, the court noted,
nothing in the regulations suggested that an attempt be made to match a particular
purchase with a particular sale or a particular item in inventory.31 Thus, the "sales"
1 American Automobile Ass'n v. Commissioner, supra note 13, at 695.
11 Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128 (1963) (prepaid fees for dancing lessons).
2Hagan Advertising Displays, Inc., supra note 2, at 2859.
" Money borrowed, Consolidated-Hammer Dry Plate & Film Co. v. Commissioner, 317
F.2d 829 (7th Cir. 1963); advances on executory contracts, Veenstra & Dehaan Coal Co., 11
T.C. 964 (1948); Woodlawn Park Cemetery, 16 T.C. 1067 (1951); advances restricted as to
use, Angelous Funeral Home, 47 T.C. No. 37 (January 17, 1967).
Hagan Advertising Displays, Inc., supra note 2, at 2858.
25Ibid.
Treas. Reg. § 1.471-1 (1958).
2Treas. Reg. § 1.471-1 (1958).
2 Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1 (a) (ii) (1957).
2... where there is actual receipt and the funds are at the unrestricted disposal of the
taxpayer... all the events have occurred that call for accrual. It has not been the practice of
tax accounting to enter upon a further inquiry as to whether the income has been 'earned'
in order to defer reporting of such income to a later year." Automobile Club of New York,
Inc., 32 T.C. 906, 913 (1959), ayJd., 304 F.2d 781 (2d Cir. 1962).
20 Hagan Advertising Displays, Inc., supra note 2, at 2858. "It is settled that each 'taxable
year' must be treated as a separate unit, and all items of gross income and deductions must
be reflected in terms of their posture at the close of the year." Burnet v. Sandford & Brooks,
282 U.S. 359 (1931). See Heiner v. Mellon, 304 U.S. 271 (1938); Guaranty Trust v. Commis-
sioner, 303 U.S. 493 (1938); Security Flour Mills v. Commissioner, 321 U.S. 281 (1944); Reis
v. Commissioner, 142 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1944). See generally Oberdorfer & Michelman, A
Commentary on Tax Administration and Accrual Accounting, 12 AM. U. L. Rv. 135 (1963).
" Hagan Advertising Displays Inc., supra note 2, at 2858, referring to the regulation de-
fining gross income. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-3(a) (1957). The court noted that whether petitioner
could have completed the signs to such an extent and so set them apart as to have them be-
come the property of the customers was not at issue.
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the court referred to were based upon the fixed contractual obligations between the
parties and not upon completion of goods or passage of title.
Although the dissent in Hagan raises the constitutional issue of taxing more than
gross incomea 2 it is well to note that essentially the same argument could have been
rendered in the service cases. For in those cases none of the expenses in rendering
the services had been incurred beyond the year of receipt of the prepayments, yet
their total advances were subject to taxation. Here, too, the situation is similar in that
Hagan would be allowed to account for cost of goods sold within the taxable year of
receipt, but is not allowed to defer recognition of income until the transac-
tion would be complete in some future year. Thus, the court in Hagan maintained
the integrity of the "annual" basis of collection of revenues.
Recognition of the accrual method of accounting and the regulatory dictates for
dealing with inventories and sales notwithstanding, the overriding principles of the
tax system demand inclusion in income of payments in the year received. Thus, the
need for legislation to coordinate more closely the revenue needs of the nation and
commercial practice in reflecting financial position is markedly elucidated by this case.
82Lela Sullenger, 11 T.C. 1076 (1948). But see Bent v. Commissioner, 56 F.2d 99 (9th Cir.
1932).
Fourteenth Amendment-Clause Against Self-Incrimination-No Sanction
to Attorney Using Privilege-Spevack v. Klein, - U.S. -, 87 S. Ct. 625
(1967).
SAMUEL SPEVACK, A NEW YORK ATrORNEY, refused to honor a subpoena duces tecum
and produce financial records and refused to testify at a judicial inquiry. The at-
torney's only defense was that the records and his testimony would tend to incrimi-
nate him. The Appellate Division, Second Department, entered an order confirm-
ing the report of the referee directing that the attorney be disbarred. The Court of
Appeals of New York affirmed,' basing its decision on the authority of Cohen v.
Hurley2 and on the premise that the fifth amendment did not apply to records re-
quired to be kept under law.
The principle issue in the case is whether a lawyer who is asked to produce docu-
ments and records at a judicial inquiry under Rule IV (6) of the Civil Practice An-
nual of New York3 can invoke his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination
without having to fear the sanction of disbarment.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the New York court and held that no
sanction can be imposed on one claiming the privilege not to incriminate himself
and that the documents required to be kept by the attorney were not "public" and
so were within the privilege.4
'16 N.Y.2d 1048, 266 N.Y.S.2d 126, 213 N.E.2d 457 (1966).
2366 U.S. 117 (1961).
Civil Practice Annual of New York, Rule IV (6), 9-24 (1964).
- U.S.-, 87 S.Ct. 625 (1967).
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Cohen v. Hurley, the authority for the Court of Appeals of New York,5 held that
an attorney who refused to testify could be disbarred.6 It permitted New York to
interpret its own privilege against self-incrimination, and New York refused to make
it available in judicial inquiries similar to the one in Spevack. Cohen also held that
the fourteenth amendment did not apply the fifth amendment's self-incrimination
clause to the states.7 Twining v. New Jerseys had set the ground work for decisions
like the one in Cohen by declaring that states would allow the privilege only when
"necessary and expedient" and that exemption from "compulsory self-incrimination"
could be a "forced construction of the Constitution,"9
In Malloy v. Hogan,O the Court, while it did not explicitly overrule Cohen, held
that the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment applied to the states
through the fourteenth." In Spevack, Cohen is finally expressly overruled.
The Court in the instant case is especially alarmed with the imposition of a "pen-
alty" on anyone pleading the privilege against self-incrimination. It insists that no
sanction influence the constitutional right to remain silent.' 2 It insists the potency of
the privilege is diminished by anything less than a liberal construction.13 Though
these principles are by no means new,14 many cases, though not all,'6 had found their
way around them and virtually disregarded them. In Beilan v. Board of Public Edu-
cation, School Dist. of Philadelphia'8 and Lerner v. Casey,17 a teacher and a subway
conductor had refused to answer questions concerning affiliations past or present
with the Communist Party, and their employers summarily discharged them on
grounds of "incompetency" and "doubtful trust and reliability."' 8 The majority opin-
ion of the Court in these cases and in many similar cases insisted that the discharge
Spevack v. Klein, supra note 1, at 1048, 266 N.Y.S.2d 126, 213 N.E.2d 457 (1966).
C Cohen v. Hurley, supra note 2, at 125-27.
7Id. at 127-29.
8211 U.S. 78 (1908).
RId. at 114.
"0378 U.S. 1 (1964).
uId. at 11.
"Spevack v. Klein, supra note 4, at 628: "This conclusion is fortified by our recent de-
cision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25...." Malloy
v. Hogan, supra note 10, at 8; see also Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965), where
the Court held that the fifth amendment in its direct application to the Federal Govern-
ment, and in its bearing on the states by reason of the fourteenth amendment forbids either
comment by the prosecutor on the accused's silence or instructions by the court that such
silence is evidence of guilt.
""Constitutional provisions for the security of personal property should be liberally
construed. A close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficiency..." Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35 (1886).
1, See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). See also Brain v. United States, 168 U.S.
532, 542-43 (1899); Hardy v. United States, 186 U.S. 224, 229 (1902); Smith v. United States,
348 U.S. 147, 150 (1954).
See In re Holland, 377 111. 346, 36 N.E.2d 543 (1941); In re Kaffenburg, 188 N.Y. 49, 80
N.E. 570 (1907); In re Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 116 N.E. 782 (1917); Matter of Schneidkraut, 231
App. Div. 109, 246 N.Y. Supp. 505 (1930).
18357 U.S. 399 (1958).
11357 U.S. 468 (1958).
'8 See also Nelson v. Los Angeles County, 362 U.S. 1 (1960); Kimm v. Rosenberg, 363 U.S.
405 (1960); Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); In re Anastaplo, 366
U.S. 82 (1961); but see Slockower v. Board of Higher Education of City of New York, 350
U.S. 551 (1956).
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of the employees was not a direct sanction on their use of the privilege against self-
incrimination, but the dissenting Justices adamantly objected. "We compound error
in these decisions. We not only impute wrongdoing to those who invoke their con-
stitutional rights. We go further and impute the worst possible motives to them."' 9
It is interesting to note that the Special Committee on Communist Tactics, Strategy
and Objections was quoted as commenting, "We should and must protect funda-
mental rights-even of Communists." 20 The article went on to note that the individ-
ual's fundamental rights are hardly protected if their exercise is a reason for dis-
barment.21
The application of the privilege against self-incrimination to the states will ob-
viously have an impact on the states' power to require an attorney to demonstrate
his qualifications for admission to the bar. It will have an even greater impact on the
states burden of proving failure of qualification after admission. The Spevack case
magnifies its effect. In general, as the Court indicated in Dent v. West Virginia,22
"The power of the State to provide for the general welfare of its people authorizes it
to prescribe all such regulations as, in its judgment, will secure or tend to secure
them against the consequences of ignorance and incapacity as well as of deception
and fraud." 2 In Orloff v. Willoughby24 the Court affirmed the appellate court's deci-
sion to refuse a physician a commission as an officer after he was inducted into the
Army, because he refused to answer whether he was or ever had been a member of
the Communist Party. The majority opinion said that the Army had the discretion
to decide what qualifications need be met before a commission be granted; it in-
terpreted as it pleased the applicant's refusal to assist in determining his qualifica-
tions by his pleading the fifth amendment. Justice Black dissented in Orloff, writing:
Doubtless there are some who would make it a crime for a person to claim this
privilege. If an attempt is to be made to punish draftees for asserting constitu-
tional claims, as I can hardly believe it would, it should be done only by an act
of Congress. Should such be attempted I would hope that this Court would
promptly declare an act to that effect unconstitutional. 25
This is the rationale that the Court in Spevack weights heavily to balance the "public
interest" which concerned the Court in Dent. Though it is obviously inaccurate to
describe privilege to practice law as a constitutional right, it is important to recog-
nize that this privilege once it has vested is not without clear and valuable rights
and should not "be subject to arbitrary revocation." 20
Spevack also touches on the problem: what records and documents come under
10Beilan v. United States, supra note 16, at 415 (dissenting opinion); see also Kimm v.
Rosenberg, 363 U.S. 405, 410 (1960) (dissenting opinion); Ulmann v. United States, 350
U.S. 422, 445-46 (1956) (dissenting opinion).
20 Brown, Lawyers and the Fifth Amendment, 40 A.B.A.J. 404, 407 (1954).
2 1 Id. at 407.
- 129 U.S. 118 (1889).
1MId. at 122. See also Hawker v. New Jersey, 170 U.S. 189 (1897). "It is elemental that a
state has broad power to establish and enforce standards of conduct within its borders rela-
tive to the health of everyone there." Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954).
1' 345 U.S. 83 (1953).
Id. at 97 (dissenting opinion).
"Weigel, The Fifth Amendment and the Lawyer's Responsibility, 34 NEB. L. REv. 586
(1955).
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the privilege? Generally, a state employee keeping public books for the state, or a
corporate agent keeping records for the corporation, must produce the same upon
request, and has no privilege regarding them.27 In Shapiro v. United States,28 the
Court distinguished between "papers exclusively private and documents having pub-
lic aspects." 29 In United States v. White,30 the Court held that "The Constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination is essentially a personal one, applying to nat-
ural individuals,"8 ' and this includes their individual property. In Spevack, the
Court decided that the records requested were private papers3 2 and so subject to the
privilege, and did not find it necessary to reach the problem of whether Shapiro
should be overruled in its entirety.3
There has always been a conflict between the public interest and the clause
against self-incrimination. Today the courts are gradually expanding the privilege.3 4
The Court wrote, in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n:3 5
It [the privilege] reflects many of our fundamental values and the most noble
aspirations; our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusa-
torial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice ... 3
Justice Black, in In re Anastaplo,37 warned the courts that there was a trend driving
men to become "government-fearing" and "time serving" because the Government
is being permitted to strike out at those who are fearless enough to say what they
think. He insisted that this trend must be stopped, "if we are to keep faith with the
Founders of our Nation and pass on to future generations of Americans the great
27 See Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 588-90 (1946); Wilson v. United States, 221
U.S. 861 (1911); Drier v. United States, 221 U.S. 394 (1911); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v.
Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 221 U.S. 612 (1911); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478
(1913); Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74 (1913); Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 U.S.
151 (1923).
335 U.S. 1 (1948).
2
1 Id. at 34.
-0322 U.S. 694 (1944).
Id. at 698.
"The documents sought in the subpoena were petitioner's day book, cash receipts book,
cash disbursements book, check book stubs, petty cash book and vouchers, general ledger
and journal, cancelled checks and bank statements, pass books and other evidences of ac-
counts, record of loans made, payroll records, and state and federal tax returns and work
sheets relative thereto." Spevack v. Klein, supra note 4, at 629.
3Ibid.
""One of the most valuable prerogatives of the citizen." Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591,
610 (1896). "Recent re-examination of the history and meaning of the fifth amendment has
emphasized anew that one of the basic functions of the privilege is to protect innocent
men." Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 421 (1957). See also Slockower v. Board of
Higher Education, supra note 22, at 557-58. "It is a barrier interposed between the indi-
vidual and the power of the government, a barrier interposed by the sovereign people of
the state; and neither legislators nor judges are free to overleap it." Matter of Doyle, 257
N.Y. 244, 250 (1921); the clause against self-incrimination "is both an expression of our
opposition to justice administered by inquisition and, at the same time, the bulwark of our
protection from inquisitorial practices." Huard, The Fifth Amendment-An Evaluation, 42
GEo. L. J. 345 (1954).
378 U.S. 52 (1964).
Id. at 55.
S366 U.S. 82 (1961).
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heritage of freedom.... [W]e must return to the original language of the Bill of
Rights."38 This is the driving force behind the decision in Spevack v. Klein and a
legion of other recent decisions of the Supreme Court.8 9
18Id. at 116.
"Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-44
(1963); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962); Malloy v. Hogan, supra note 10;
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Labor Law-Runaway Shop--Bargaining Ord~rs-Local 57, Garment
Workers v. NLRB (Garwin Corp.), - F.2d - (64 L.R.R.M. 2159) (D.C.Cir.
1967).
GARWIN CORPORATION, CLOSED ITS NEW YORK PLANT and moved its operations to
Florida, without notifying the New York employees or their majority representative,
Local 57, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO. The union
filed unfair labor practice charges against Garwin under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, sections 8 (a) (5), (3) and (l).1 Upon hearing, the trial examiner found
that Garwin had violated the act by shutting down its New York plant and discharg-
ing its employees for the purposes of (1) depriving the employees of their organi-
zational and collective bargaining rights protected under section 7 of the act 2; and
(2) avoiding its duty to bargain with the union;3 and by failing to notify and bar-
gain with the union concerning the move and its effects upon employees.4 Con-
sidering Garwin's possible choices of either resuming its New York operations or con-
tinuing its new Florida operations, the trial examiner recommended the Board's
standard order in runaway shop cases, i.e., an order that Garwin offer the discharged
employees reinstatement and back pay at either site, and that it bargain with the
union either in New York or, if it remained in Florida, upon the union's re-estab-
lishment of its majority among the Florida employees.5 The Board, upon reviewing
the trial examiner's decision, affirmed his findings, but enlarged his suggested bar-
gaining order. It ordered Garwin, even if it chose to remain in Florida, to bargain
with the union upon request, without requiring the union to re-establish its major-
ity. The Board's order, however, limited the "bar" of any resulting Florida contract,
during which the union's majority might not be questioned, to a period of one year
instead of the usual three.6 The Board reasoned that to deprive the employer of the
"fruits" of his illegal action, and in "balancing" the various interests involved, the
161 Stat. 140-41 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (5), (3), (1) (1964).
'61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
'61 Stat. 140-41 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (5), (3), (1) (1964).
'61 Stat. 140-41 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (5), (1) (1964).
See note 13 and accompanying text on standard runaway shop order.
The Board's original contract bar period was only one year. See, Reed Roller Brt. Co.,
72 N.L.R.B. 927 (1947), for early history of contract bar rule. It is now ordinarily three years.
General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R. B. 1123 (1962).
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rights of the newly hired Florida employees to choose their own bargaining repre-
sentative "must yield to the statutory objective of fashioning a meaningful remedy
for the unfair labor practices found."7
On cross petitions for enforcement and review, the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, in a split decision, set aside that part of the Board's order requiring
the employer to bargain without re-establishment of the union's majority, holding
that such an order violated the statutorily protected rights of the new Florida em-
ployees to choose to be represented or not to be represented by a union.8 The ma-
jority felt that the Board should not discipline the employer "at the expense" of the
new employees. The dissent, on the other hand, expressed the view that the Board's
order represented a proper exercise of its discretionary power to fashion a remedy
to effectuate the policies of the act. This was one of those instances in which the
Board might well refuse to regard the new employees' right of choice as absolute in
light of the employer's unlawful action and accordingly, in the balance, require this
right to yield to an order which would deprive the runaway employer of the benefits
of his anti-union move and illegal refusal to bargain.
An employer who moves his plant to avoid the unionization of his employees or to
avoid bargaining with a union selected by his employees in an appropriate bargain-
ing unit commits an unfair labor practice.9 The Board has broad authority to fash-
ion remedies for such unfair labor practices. For section 10 (c) of the act empowers
the Board to issue orders requiring a respondent, not only to cease and desist from
his unfair labor practices, but also "to take such affirmative action ... as will effec-
tuate the policies of this Act."10 In view of this wide discretion, the courts will not
disturb a Board order "unless it can be shown that the order is a patent attempt
to achieve ends other than those which can fairly be said to effectuate the policies
of the Act.""1
Although the Board has claimed for itself the power to order a runaway employer
to return to his original location,' 2 traditional Board orders dealing with runaway
shops have prescribed alternate courses of action, at the option of the employer.
7 Garwin Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. No. 59, modified sub nom., Local 47, Garment Workers v.
NLRB, 64 L.R.R.M. 2159 (D.D.C. 1967).
8 National Labor Relations Act § 7, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
9 Sidele Fashions, Inc., 133 N.LR.B. 547 (1961), enforced sub nom., Garment Workers v.
NLRB, 305 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1962); Schieber Millinery Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 937 (1939), modified
per curiam sub nom., NLRB v. Schieber, 116 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1940); Industrial Fabricating,
Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 162 (1957), enforced per curiam sub nom., NLRB v. Macneish, 272 F.2d
184 (6th Cir. 1959); California Footwear Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 765 (1955), enforced in part sub
nom., NLRB v. Lewis, 246 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1957); Rome Products Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1217
(1948). When motivation is predominantly economic, an employer's relocation of his plant
is, of course, not an unfair labor practice. Brown Truck & Trailer Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 999
(1953); Mount Hope Finishing Co. v. NLRB, 211 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1954), setting aside 106
N.L.R.B. 480 (1953); NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961), setting aside 127
N.L.R.B. 212 (1960). Although relocating a plant has thus been held to be an unfair
labor practice when motivated by anti-union animus, an employer's closing his plant and
going completely out of business is not an unfair labor practice even if the employer's action
is discriminatorily motivated. Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
1061 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 160 (c) (1964).
u Fibreboard Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 216 (1964).
2Schieber Millinery Co., supra note 9.
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Under these orders, the employer may either return to the original site or he may
remain at the new location in which case he must either offer re-employment with
moving costs to unlawfully discharged employees plus reimbursement for lost earn-
ings or compensate these employees for lost earnings until they find substantially
equivalent employment.' 3 Furthermore, under the usual order before Garwin, the
employer was required to bargain with the union at the new plant site only if the
union again demonstrated its majority.14
In Garwin, the Board felt that this standard remedy was insufficient. It was al-
most certain that none of the New York employees would move to Florida in view
of the distance involved and the fact that many of them were married women. Fur-
thermore, the tight state of the New York labor market made re-employment there
not only possible, but probable. Consequently, the Board's use in the Garwin case of
its standard order with its requirement that the union re-establish its majority as a
condition precedent to the employer's bargaining with it, would have resulted in the
employer's escape from the bargaining obligation established at the New York plant.
He would thereby enjoy the "fruit" of his New York unfair labor practice. To pre-
vent this and to deter the employer's future repetition of similar unfair labor prac-
tices, the Board refashioned its standard remedy and ordered the employer to bar-
gain with a union which not only did not have a majority but did not represent any
of the new Florida employees.
Leaving aside, for a moment, the fact that no New York employees moved to Flor-
ida, it may be noted that an absence of majority status has not prevented the issuance
and enforcement of bargaining orders when the circumstances have required the
dissipation of the effect and/or the continuance of an employer's unfair labor prac-
tices.1 5 In such cases, the employer has not been permitted to benefit from his own
wrongdoing, and the original selection of the union as bargaining representative
by a majority of the employees has not been disregarded because in the meantime
the majority had been dissipated either by the passage of time or as a result of the
employer's unfair labor practices.
In short distance plant relocation cases such an NLRB v. Lewis,' 6 it has been held
that a bargaining order should not depend upon a re-established majority at the new
plant consisting of reinstated as well as new employees. Such a position was adopted
as a justifiable and appropriate remedy in the Lewis case. The court held that under
normal circumstances, in cases of short distance plant relocations, it might be fairly
assumed that upon being offered reinstatement at the nearby new location under a
Board order, the old employees would accept it and that the original majority es-
tablished at the old plant would continue and be preserved at the new plant. But in
'z E.g., Sidele Fashions, Inc., supra note 9.
"Ibid.
Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1944); NLRB v. International Union, Progres-
sive Mine Workers, 375 U.S. 396 (1963); NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962); NLRB v. P.
Lorillard Co., 314 U.S. 512 (1942); Sakrete of Northern Cal., Inc. v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 902 (9th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965); NLRB v. Geigy Co., 211 F.2d 553 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 821 (1954); Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, NLRB v. Andrew Jergens Co., 175
F.2d 130 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 827 (1949).
16 Supra note 9.
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NLRB v. Rapid Bindery,'7 the court refused to enforce such an unconditional bar-
gaining order. In that case, the Board found anti-union animus; but the court of
appeals held that the predominant motivation for moving was economic. Thus,
Rapid Bindery is distinguishable from Lewis in which anti-unionism was found to
be predominant. In Garwin, the court did not distinguish Rapid Bindery from
Lewis on the basis of difference in predominant motivation, but viewed the holdings
as conflicting and accepted Rapid Bindery as controlling.18
When an unlawful relocation has been made at a long distance, the union has
been required to re-establish its majority before the Board would issue a bargaining
order.19 Admittedly, long distance moves do not subject the employee to the same
type of on-the-job discrimination that is present in short moves. But it seems unsat-
isfactory to distinguish between short distance discrimination which will discourage
employees from taking up their old jobs at new sites and carrying the union majority
with them, and that type of discrimination involved in long distance moves which
by their very nature discourage social uprooting and transplantation. And yet a
short move may engender an unconditional bargaining order on this discriminatory
basis, whereas a long move will not.
The second part of the representation problem in Garwin is raised by the fact
that no New York discriminatees had moved to Florida to reclaim their old jobs.
Thus, even if the court had accepted the rationale of Lewis, there would still be the
problem that, at least in Lewis, some of the discriminatees had moved to the new
plant, while none had moved in Garwin. It has been held, in Sakrete of Northern
California v. NLRB, 20 that even an absence from employment of all union mem-
bers at the time of a Board order to bargain would not defeat the order, when the
unfair labor practices of the employer had occasioned the absence. Although Sakrete
does not involve a plant relocation, the predominance of anti-union motivation is
similar to that in Garwin, as is the fact that the Board order to bargain involved a
situation in which none of the discriminatees were re-employed by the employer.
The court in Garwin expressed disapproval of what it believed to be the punitive
aspects of the Board's order with respect to the employer. But it is arguable whether
requiring an employer to fulfill the bargaining obligation, which he avoided by his
unfair labor practices, can realistically be regarded as punishment. Instead, the
court's opinion in Garwin reversing the Board in so far as the unconditional bar-
gaining order is concerned, leaves the Board without an effective deterrent in plant
relocations spurred by anti-unionism when the labor market at the old plant site
quickly absorbs discharged employees.2 1
Supra note 9.
The majority was not bothered by the possibility that Rapid Bindery might have been
decided differently if anti-union animus has been found predominant.
19 Mount Hope Finishing Co., supra note 9; Brown Truck & Trailer Mfg. Co., supra note
9; NLRB v. MacKneish, supra note 9.
20 Supra note 15.
-1 The character of a deterring order in such situations has been aptly described by the
Supreme Court in National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 364 (1940):
The Board asserts a public right vested in it as a public body, charged in the public in-
terest with the duty of preventing unfair labor practices. The public right and duty
extend not only to the prevention of unfair labor practices by the employer in the future,
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At first blush, it might seem that the Board order in Garwin was, as the court held,
unjustifiably harsh in its impact upon the rights of the new Florida employees to
choose their own representative. But these rights, as the Board pointed out, were
themselves the product of the employer's unfair labor practices. 22 These people
would not have been employed in the first place had the employer not committed
the unfair labor practices of moving his plant to escape unionism and the obligation
to bargain. Under these circumstances, the Board's order appears less harsh than
upon first glance.
Given the competing factors in Garwin and cases like it: the relocation of a plant
for anti-union reasons, the relatively unaffected position of the employer under the
standard order and the right of new employees to choose representation, there is
much to be said for the new remedy fashioned by the Board but rejected by the court.
Its impact on the freedom of the new Florida employees would have been minimized
by reduction of the contract bar period to one year. In the meantime, the Board's
order would have prevented the employer from reaping the benefit of his unfair
labor practices, while at the same time, the Florida employees would not have been
saddled with the union beyond the one year period unless they so desired.
but to the prevention of his enjoyment of any advantage which he has gained by vio-
lation of the Act.
2 In the circumstances, the interests of newly hired employees whose very jobs, and hence
statutory protection, exists by virtue of; (1) [Garwin's] unfair labor practices, (2) the
Board's unwillingness to order the return of the plant to its original location, and (3)
the failure of discriminatees to displace them by accepting reinstatement ...
Garwin Corp., supra note 7.
Secured Transactions-Effect Given UCC Article 9 in Petition for Reclama-
tion Under Chapter X of Bankruptcy Act-Fruehauf Corp. v. Yale Express
System, 370 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1966).
DURING THE SUMMER AND FALL OF 1964, Yale Express System purchased truck bodies
and trailers from Fruehauf on credit, payment to be made 30 days after each deliv-
ery of truck bodies and 90 days after delivery of trailers. Fruehauf extended credit
in reliance on a current Dun & Bradstreet report which reflected Yale's apparently
sound financial condition. In February, 1965, Yale informed Fruehauf that the fi-
nancial statements used in preparing the credit report were incorrect and that in-
stead of operating at a profit during 1963, Yale had sustained a net loss in excess of
one million dollars. Fruehauf immediately asserted its right to reclaim the equip-
ment and rescind the contract based on Yale's material misrepresentation of its fi-
nancial position. In subsequent negotiations, however, Fruehauf agreed to waive
this right and allowed Yale to retain possession of the equipment and repay the debt
on an installment basis extended over 68 months. To secure payment, Yale gave
Fruehauf chattel mortgage liens on the truck bodies and trailers, the security agree-
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ments being executed in accordance with provisions of New York's Uniform Com-
mercial Code.1 Two months later, Yale filed a petition for reorganization under
Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act.2 Claiming that Yale had failed to make five re-
quired payments, Fruehauf made formal demand to Yale's trustee in bankruptcy
for repossession of the property covered by the security agreement. Upon the trus-
tee's refusal to comply with the demand, Fruehauf brought a petition for re-
clamation in the reorganization court.
The district court, adhering to the traditional distinction between chattel
mortgages and conditional sales for the purpose of locating title to the property,
held that the security agreement gave Fruehauf a mere lien on the equipment, that
it was the property of the debtor and therefore not subject to reclamation by the
secured creditor.3 On appeal, the Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, reversed and
remanded, holding:
Since the Uniform Commercial Code has abolished the technical distinctions
between the various security devices, federal bankruptcy courts should no longer
feel compelled to engage in the purely theoretical exercises of locating "tide,"
nor should considerations of where "title lies" influence the courts in the exer-
cise of their equitable discretion.... Equitable considerations and the sub-
stance of the transaction should govern, regardless of the form of the security
agreement.4
Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act is, as its title 'Corporate Reorganizations' in-
dicates, remedial in nature, seeking the preservation rather than the (forced) liqui-
dation of corporate assets.5 To this end, the statute gives the reorganization courts
wide discretionary powers over the disposition of the debtor's property, in hopes
that corporate integrity can be preserved sufficient to support a revitalization of the
business. Specifically, section 116 (4)6 of the Act allows the court to enjoin any fur-
ther proceedings against the debtor to enforce a lien, pending a final decree approv-
ing the petition for reorganization. Section 1487 provides, "Until otherwise ordered
by the judge, an order approving a petition shall operate as a stay of a prior pend-
ing bankruptcy, mortgage foreclosure .... and of any act or other proceeding to en-
force a lien against the debtor's property."s Thus, once the petition has won ap-
proval, the court will seek to give the debtor sufficient time to stabilize his position
without the burden of fending off creditors seeking immediate satisfaction of prior
1 N.Y. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-302 and 9-304 [Hereinafter cited as UCC].
5 Bankruptcy Act §§ 101-276, 52 Stat. 883 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1964).$ Matter of Yale Express System, Inc., 250 F.Supp. 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
' Fruehauf Corp. v. Yale Express System, 370 F.2d 433, 438 (2d Cir. 1966).
5 For a discussion of the nature and purpose of Chapter X, together with an analysis of
judicial remedies prior to 1938, see 6 CoLLIFR, BANKRUPTCY 0.01-0.08 (14th ed. 1964).
6 Bankruptcy Act § 116, 52 Stat. 883 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 516 (1964), provides:
Upon the approval of a petition [for reorganization], the judge may, in addition to
the jurisdiction, powers, and duties hereinabove and elsewhere in this chapter con-
ferred and imposd upon him and the court-....
(4) in addition to the relief provided by section 11 of this Act, enjoin or stay until
final decree the commencement or continuation of a suit against the debtor or its
trustee or any act or proceeding to enforce a lien upon the property of the debtor.
Bankruptcy Act § 148, 52 Stat. 883 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1964).
8 Ibid.
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claims. In theory, this will allow the debtor to eventually settle all debts as the nec-
essary assets become available and, at the same time, salvage a going concern.
The essence of a secured transaction is the creditor's acquisition of a property
right in the collateral. In bankruptcy proceedings, his position is superior to that of
the general (unsecured) creditors. Where outright liquidation is sought,9 the secured
creditor's claim will be satisfied from the proceeds of the liquid capital flowing from
that collateral in which his "property right" resided. In Chapter X proceedings,
however, a creditor must show more than a perfected security interest. As is stated
in In re Lake's Laundry,lO reclamation will only be granted if the petitioner can
show that the collateral belongs to him and is not the property of the debtor." In
granting reclamation, the court used the time-honored concept of "title" to deter-
mine ownership to the property, and in doing so looked to the state law governing
the form of the transaction-in this case, a conditional sales contract-to determine
that title to the property was retained by the petitioner and it was not the property
of the debtor for purposes of a reorganization proceeding.' 2 As the court pointed out
in Lake's Laundry, state laws then in effect generally placed title to the collateral
in the hands of the conditional vendor, while limiting a chattel mortgagee to a mere
lien on the property. 13 Despite a vigorous dissent by Judge Learned Hand, who
argued that the distinction between title and lien was an absurd basis upon which
to exercise the court's equitable-discretionary powers in a reorganization proceed-
ing,14 it was to this state law-controlled distinction that the majority turned for reso-
lution of the secured creditor's rights. Under the rule of Lake's Laundry then, the
petitioner in a reclamation proceeding must; (1) prove a perfected security interest
in the collateral under the provisions of the applicable state law, and (2) then show
that the form of the security interest gives him something more than a mere lien on
the collateral, i.e. that he has a property right therein.
0In any proceeding brought under provisions of the Bankruptcy Act other than those
contained in Chapters X and XI.
1079 F.2d 326 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 622 (1935).
n One might ask why the creditor need go further once he has proved a perfected security
interest. As noted in the text, this would be to lose sight of the basic philosophy behind
Chapter X proceedings. Rather than looking primarily to the immediate satisfaction of
creditors' claims-unsecured as well as secured-the provisions of the Chapter are designed
to effectuate a stabilization of corporate assets in hopes that it will once again be capable of
meeting all its obligations. To achieve this end, it is of paramount importance that the
immediate drain on existing assets be minimized as much as possible. It was precisely this
argument that Judge Hand raised in Lake Laundry-see note 14 infra-when the court
there allowed a conditional sales vendor to withdraw assets from the debtor's estate. Of
course, the justification offered by the majority in that case rested squarely on the existing
state law, with its clear-cut distinction between the rights of conditional vendors and
chattle mortgagees.
11 Supra note 10, at 327-28.
18 Ibid.
"In re Lake's Laundry, supra note 10, at 328 (L. Hand, J., dissenting).
It seems to me a barren distinction, though indubitably true, that title does not pass
upon a conditional sale; "title" is a formal word for a purely conceptual notion; I do
not know what it means and I question whether anybody does, except perhaps legal
historians. The relations resulting from conditional sales are practically the same as
those resulting from mortgages; I would treat them as the same when we are dealing
with the reorganization of the debtor's property.
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As noted earlier, at the time this case was decided the New York Legislature had
adopted the Uniform Commercial Code, which is now in effect in 47 states and the
District of Columbia.15 Thus, in each of these jurisdictions, prior state law control-
ling secured transactions has been pre-empted by the Code provisions contained in
Article 9.16 The most monumental change wrought by the Code was the formulation
of an entirely new policy governing the creation of security interests. Pre-Code law
rested on a carefully structured series of designated form-transactions-e.g., chattel
mortgages, conditional sales, trust receipts, factor's liens, assignments of accounts re-
ceivable, etc.-each of which had arisen to meet a specific demand of secured financ-
ing.17 Surrounding each security device was a complex body of law governing the
rights and duties of each party affected by the instrument. Despite the fact that there
was little justification for these distinctions in a modern commercial setting, state
courts were reluctant to overturn precedent, and the Code draftsmen were con-
fronted with a situation which was needlessly tedious and complex for the lawyer and
dangerous and misleading for the unwary layman entering a secured financing agree-
ment.18 It can be said then, that prior to the Code, truely "the form was the thing."
The Code's solution to this problem is as simple as it is sweeping: it abolishes the
categorization of interests as dictated by the form of the security device employed,
thereby erasing the title-lien distinction which formerly denominated the interests
held by conditional sales vendors and chattel mortgagees. 19 Instead, the Code sub-
stituted a policy whereby the substantive transaction governs, not its form.2 0 Thus,
while the Code allows utilization of the standard forms in preparing secured financ-
ing agreements, it specifically negates any attempt to place reliance upon these
forms as determinative of the rights and obligations of the parties to the agreement.
Only Arizona, Idaho, and Louisiana have not enacted the Code, and legislation for
1967 is pending in the former two.
10 See Note, appended to Uniform Commercial Code § 9-102, to this effect.
17 For a general history of the common law and statutory regulations of conditional sales
see, Glenn, The Conditional Sale At Common Law and As a Statutory Security, 25 VA. L.
REv. 559 (1939). The history of chattel mortgages is contained in Glenn, The Chattel Mort-
gage as a Statutory Security, 25 VA. L. Rav. 316 (1939).
"8 As stated in the official comment to Uniform Commercial Code § 9-101:
The recognition of so many separate security devices has the result that half a dozen
filing systems covering chattle security devices may be maintaind within a state, some
on a county basis, others on a state-wide basis, each of which must be separately checked
to determine a debtor's status.
'0 This is specifically provided for in Uniform Commercial Code § 9-202; Title to Col-
lateral Immaterial:
Each provision of this Article with regard to rights, obligations and remedies applies
whether title to collateral is in the secured party or in the debtor.
The comment to this section reads in part:
The rights and duties of the parties to a secured transaction and of third parties are
stated in this Article without reference to location of "title" to the collateral. Thus the
incidents of a security interest which secures the purchase price of goods are the same
under this Article whether the secured party appears to have retained title or the
debtor appears to have obtained title and then conveyed it or a lien to the secured
party.... (emphasis added).
" As stated in the official comment to the Uniform Commercial Code § 9-101:
The aim of this Article is to provide a simple and unified structure within which the
immense variety of present-day secured financing transactions can go forward with less
cost and with greater certainty.
Under this Article the traditional distinctions among security devices, based largely
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Yale Express involves the application of the Code's Article 9 provisions to bank-
ruptcy proceedings. Of course, the Code can in no way be construed as limiting the
authority or discretion of federal courts acting under the Bankruptcy Act.21 Never-
theless, the term "property of the debtor" as set forth in sections 116 (4) and 148 of
the Act 22 is not statutorily defined, and following the rule of Lake's Laundry, fed-
eral courts have turned to state law to determine in whom the property right to the
collateral rested.23 In the instant case, Fruehauf asserted that with the adoption of
the Code, prior New York law in the field of secured transactions had been pre-
empted and the provisions of Article 9 were controlling as to the rights of creditors
holding a perfected security interest in collateral then in possession of the debtor.
To support their petition under Article 9, Fruehauf cited the Code's total departure
from the title-lien test, as expressed in section 9-202.24 Fruehauf further buttressed
its argument by citing the court to the official comment to section 9-50725 of the Code,
which urged adoption by the bankruptcy courts of the Code's policy of avoiding ar-
tificial distinction based on form alone.
The district court chose to ignore the innovations made by the Code, relying in-
stead upon the traditional title-lien distinction. In reaching its decision, the court
turned to prior law as established in bankruptcy proceedings, dismissing Fruehauf's
reliance on Article 9 as "misplaced." 26 Apparently the court felt that the Code should
not be allowed to intrude into an area more properly controlled by settled bank-
ruptcy precedents as expressed in Lake's Laundry.27
on form, are not retained; the Article applies to all transactions intended to create
security interests in personal property and fixtures, and the single term "security in-
terest" substitutes for the variety of descriptive terms which has grown up at common
law and under a hundred year accretion of statutes. This does not mean that the old
forms may not be used, and § 9-102 (2) makes it clear that they may be.
" This is expressly recognized by both courts in the instant case. See, Matter of Yale Ex-
press System, Inc., supra note 3 at 254, n. 8; Fruehauf Corp. v. Yale Express System, Inc.,
supra note 4 at 438, n.3.
2 Supra notes 6 and 7.
2 See e.g., In re White Plains Ice Serv., Inc., 109 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1940); In re Sun Cab
Co., 67 F.Supp. 137 (D.D.C. 1946).
2
, Supra note 19.
2 The official comment to Uniform Commercial Code § 9-507 reads, in part:
But since this Article adopts neither a "title" nor a "lien" theory of security interests
.. . the granting or denying of, for example, petitions of reclamation in bankruptcy
proceedings should not be influenced by speculations as to whether the secured party
had "title" to the collateral or "merely a lien."
* Matter of Yale Express System, Inc., supra note 3 at 253.
27In re Lake's Laundry, supra note 10. It should be noted that the lower court's opinion
has not accepted the rule of Lake's Laundry in toto. As noted in the text, the holding of
that case was two-part: First, that the bankruptcy court should look to existing state law
in order to ascertain whether or not the creditor has a perfected security interest; secondly,
to once again turn to state law to determine if the particular interest of the creditor gave
him title, i.e. a property interest in the collateral. The lower court here has read the rule
to mean that bankruptcy courts are to look to prior bankruptcy proceedings construing the
(then) existing state law. There is insufficient material in the court's opinion to indicate
by what method this construction was arrived at, other than the court's apparent antago-
nism to the Code's intrusion in a bankruptcy proceeding under Chapter X. The irony is
that, by disregarding the Code provision and adhering to prior bankruptcy precedents, the
court is, in effect, limiting its own equitable powers. For although not specifically stated,
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In reversing the district court's ruling, Circuit Judge Kaufman, speaking for the
majority, noted past criticism of the "judicially developed doctrine that a creditor's
right to reclamation is dependent on who has 'title' to the property," 28 and pointed
out that the commercial doctrines underpinning that precedent have now been ab-
rogated by the Code's widespread adoption. In its consideration of the official com-
ment to section 9-507,29 the court cited with approval the national trend toward uni-
formity in commercial law and expressed a desire not to impede its progress by em-
ploying "anachronistic distinctions"3 0 to determine property rights in proceedings
brought under Chapter X. Inasmuch as the lower court appeared to have placed
emphasis on the title-lien distinction in reaching its conclusion, the appellate court
reversed and remanded with instructions to reconsider the petition on the basis of
"equitable considerations and the substance of the transaction, regardless of the
form of the security agreement."' 1
In reaching this decision the court apparently sought to preserve its own best in-
terests. With the Code fast becoming the law of the land, it is inconceivable that it
should be construed as to be incompatible with Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act
when both statutes must necessarily govern rights in identical transactions. Although
many provisions of the federal act are deeply routed in precedent, judicial applica-
tion of Chapter X and its predecessor32 was initially guided by then-prevailing stan-
dards of commercial law. The appellate decision can only be construed as judicial
recognition of the demise of many previously acceptable standards, now supplanted
by Code provisions, at least as they were once applied in Chapter X proceedings.
The viability of the new Code provisions was not the question confronting the
court. Fundamentally, it had to determine what purpose it would serve to maintain
the old standards while the rest of the commercial world was changing theirs. And,
as one commentator recently pointed out, "It should be recognized that it is the
courts and not the [Bankruptcy] Act itself, which equate 'property' with 'title' [in
proceedings brought under Chapter X]."38 In its analysis the court perceived the
weakness of adhering to stale precedent. Not only would this put Chapter X of the
Bankruptcy Act at odds with Article 9 of the Code-a result which the court points
to as undesirable purely from a policy standpoint-but it would tend to effectively
inhibit the free application of both statutes: Bankruptcy courts would be restrict-
ing their own discretionary powers to control the property of the debtor in Chapter
X proceedings,3 4 and this restriction would provide secured creditors with incentive
to demand retention of the old forms as additional protection in the event
the court implicitly holds that had the Fruehauf security interest been evidenced by a
conditional sales contract it would have been powerless to deny reclamation, which in turn
points up the validity of Judge Hands' dissent in Lake's Laundry, supra note 14).
2 Fruehauf Corp. v. Yale Express System, supra note 4, at 436.
' Supra note 25.
80 Fruehauf Corp. v. Yale Express System, supra note 4, at 437.
"IId. at 438.
" The statutory forerunner of Chapter X was § 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §
207. For an analysis of the provisions of this section prior to amendment by the Chandler
Act in 1938, see material in note 5 supra.
=Note, 8 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 101, 111 (1966).
,' See discussion in note 27 supra.
1967]
Catholic University Law Review
their debtor was thrown into a reorganization proceeding, thus restricting the effec-
tiveness of the new security interests contained in Article 9 of the U.C.C.
As the reaction to the lower court decision in this case indicates,3 5 the appellate
decision has perhaps forestalled what in time might have become the shrill clamor
for amendment to either Chapter X or Article 9 or both in an attempt to bring them
in line with each other. While the decision here certainly can not be read as demand-
ing compatibility of the two at any cost, it has at least posed the question: At what
cost incompatibility?
Note, 42 NoTRE DAME LAw. 258 (1966); Note, 8 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 101 (1966).
Torts-Parent-Child Immunity-An Analysis of Two Recent Decisions
1. Briere v. Briere. -N.H.-, 224 A.2d 588 (1966)-Negligence-Liability
of Parent for Injury to Child.
HELEN BRIERE BROUGHT AN ACTION on behalf of her two unemancipated minor chil-
dren, against their father, Maurice Brier, to recover damages for personal injuries
arising from an automobile accident on November 4, 1965. The defendant father's
motions to dismiss the action, on the ground that the parental immunity rule pre-
cluded it, were granted, and the plaintiffs excepted. On appeal, the parties agreed
that the sole question for disposition was "whether unemancipated minor children
may sue their father in tort for injuries sustained in an automobile accident."' The
Supreme Court of New Hampshire unanimously sustained the exceptions and held
that the children's cause of action was maintainable, overruling the prior case of
Levesque v. Levesque.2
The parental immunity rule was born in 1891 with the case of Hewlett v. George,8
a false imprisonment case in which the Mississippi court, citing no authorities,
denied the right of action of a minor daughter against her mother's estate, for rea-
sons that the action would disturb domestic tranquillity and interfere with parental
control. The Hewlett holding became the established general rule in American juris-
dictions with the subsequent cases of McKelvey v. McKelvey4 in 1903 and Roller v.
Roller5 in 1905. In McKelvey the dismissal of an action against a father and a step-
mother was upheld, citing Hewlett. The same result was reached in Roller, where a
father had been convicted of rape of his minor child and damages were sought for
the personal injuries inflicted. These cases were followed in other jurisdictions,
whether the conduct involved was wilful6 or negligent, 7 and whether the action was
Briere v. Briere, - N.H. -, 224 A.2d 588, 589 (1966).
299 N.H. 147, 106 A.2d 563 (1954).
868 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
4111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
537 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905).
a Cook v. Cook, 232 Mo. App. 994, 124 S.W.2d 675 (1939); Miller v. Pelzer, 159 Minn. 375,
199 N.W. 97 (1924); Smith v. Smith, 81 Ind. App. 566, 142 N.E. 128 (1924).
Ball v. Ball, 73 Wyo. 29, 269 P.2d 302 (1954) (Montana law); Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d
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brought before or after majority.8 Professor McCurdy, in examining the opinions
denying a personal injury action between parent and child, found no less than seven
reasons advanced by the courts for this stand: (1) position of the family as a quasi-
governing unit; (2) the husband-wife cases denying an action despite a married
women's statute; (3) danger of fraud; (4) possibility of succession (inheritance of
amount received in damages); (5) family exchequer (financial detriment to other
children); (6) disturbance of domestic tranquillity; and (7) interference with pa-
rental discipline and control. 9 The two principal reasons relied upon have been
danger of disturbing domestic harmony and interference with parental discipline.
The other reasons have been stressed to one degree or another; some have been held
to be unsound.10 However, none of these reasons have been held sufficient to bar an
action for injury to personal property between parent and child.11 Furthermore, they
have not been sufficient to prevent an action for personal injuries between brothers
and sisters.12
As the parental immunity rule became firmly entrenched in the court-made prin-
ciples of the American jurisdictions, a number of exceptions were steadily carved out.
The first was that the action would be permitted where the child had been "eman-
cipated"-.e., parents surrendered claim to his earnings and services, and to pa-
rental control. 18 Another has been where the conduct was intentional,' 4 and wilful
or wanton.15 Some courts have held that the action could be maintained against the
estate of the deceased parent-tortfeasor. 16 And the further exception was made where
the child was injured in the course of the parent's business activity.' 7 The most lib-
eral approach up to the time of the instant case had been that of the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court which had abrogated the parental immunity rule entirely, except in
two specific cases: (1) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of pa-
rental authority over the child; and (2) where the alleged negligent act involves
677 (D.D.C. 1948) (Maryland law); Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 163 A.2d 147 (1961);
Mesite v. Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 AtI. 753 (1929); Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118
S.E. 12 (1923); Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 Atl. 198 (1925).
8 Smith v. Smith, 81 Ind. App. 566, 142 N.E. 128 (1924).
9 McCurdy, Torts between Parent and Child, 5 VILL. L. REv. 521, 529 (1961).
1043 HARv. L. REv. 1030, 1072-77 (1930).
11 Crowley v. Crowley, 72 N.H. 241, 56 At. 190 (1903).
'uRozell v. Rozell, 256 App. Div. 61, 8 N.Y.S.2d 901, afjd, 281 N.Y. 106, 22 N.E.2d 254
(1939); Midkiff v. Midkiff, 201 Va. 829, 113 S.E.2d 875 (1960); Overlock v. Ruedemann, 147
Conn. 649, 165 A.2d 335 (1960).
'
3 Wurth v. Wurth, 322 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1959); Glover v. Glover, 44 Tenn. App. 712, 319
S.W.2d 238 (1958); Wood v. Wood, 135 Conn. 280, 63 A.2d 586 (1948).
"Treschman v. Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N.E. 961 (1901); Brown v. Cole, 198 Ark.
417, 129 S.W.2d 245 (1939); Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951).
11 Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal.2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955); Wright v. Wright, 85 Ga. App. 721,
70 S.E.2d 152 (1952); Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 111.2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956).
10 Hale v. Hale, 312 Ky. 867, 230 S.W.2d 610 (1950); Davis v. Smith, 253 F.2d 286 (3d Cir.
1958); Oliveria v. Oliveria, 305 Mass. 297, 25 N.E.2d 766 (1940); Palcsey v. Tepper, 71 N. J.
Super. 294, 176 A.2d 818 (1962).
'1 Trevarton v. Trevarton, 151 Colo. 418, 378 P.2d 640 (1963); Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash.2d
642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952); Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952); Lusk v. Lusk,
113 W.Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905 (1930).
1967]
Catholic University Law Review
an exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provision of food,
clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care.18
Justice Blandin, writing for the unanimous New Hampshire court and citing the
case of Dean v. Smith,19 stated that the parental immunity rule "is a 'court-made
rule,' and that it is the duty of the judiciary to examine it and make changes as justice
requires when the Legislature has chosen not to act." 20 The court, in further laying
the groundwork for its opinion, observed that the law of torts is not, as erroneously
considered, a "law of wrongs," but rather a "means for the creation and protection
of rights." 2l Recognizing the need for dynamism in the law of torts to meet changing
social and economic conditions, the Briere court noted that there was no common
law rule corresponding to the parental immunity doctrine and that suits have been
permitted on contract, 22 to protect the child's property rights,2 3 and against the par-
ent for malicious assault.24
The court then discussed the reasons advanced by the defendant father in support
of his position: (1) preservation of parental authority and family harmony; (2) de-
pletion of the family exchequer; and (3) the danger of fraud and collusion. It was
agreed that there was danger of fraud and collusion, but this danger is also present
in other suits, such as those between close relatives, and host and guest; yet, these
suits stand on the same footing as actions between strangers. Moreover, it is the court
system's expertise and duty to ferret out trickery or fraud in cases where it might
exist. The court refused to allow such a mere opportunity to act as an insurmount-
able barrier to an "honest and meritorious action by a minor."25
In 1930, in Dunlap v. Dunlap,2 o the New Hampshire courts had rejected the "fam-
ily exchequer" argument as having no substantial weight, stating that it "ignored the
parent's power to distribute favors as he will, and leaves out of the picture the de-
pletion of the child's assets of health and strength through the injury."27 The court
reinforced the rationale of Dunlap in noting that the prevalence of insurance "can-
not be ignored in determining whether a court should continue to discriminate
against a class of individuals by depriving them of a right enjoyed by all other in-
dividuals."28
The court found it difficult to realize how parental authority and family well-
being is jeopardized anymore in cases of this nature than in the suits uniformly al-
lowed in contract29 and for assault.30 The "parent nearly always desires above all to
Goller v. White, 20 Wis.2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
19Dean v. Smith, 106 N.H. 314, 211 A.2d 410 (1965).
" Briere v. Briere, supra note 1, at 590.
nIbid.
12 Hall v. Hall, 44 N.H. 293 (1862).
21 Crowley v. Crowley, supra note 11.
2 4Zebnik v. Rozmus, 81 N.H. 45, 124 Atd. 460 (1923).
Briere v. Briere, supra note 1 at 590.
84 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905 (1930).
T Id. at 361, 150 At. at 909.
Briere v. Briere, supra note 1, at 590.
See supra note 22.
10 See supra note 24.
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protect and benefit his children." 8 ' The court cited Dean v. Smith 2 and Gaudreau v.
Gaudreau,88 two decisions of the New Hampshire court which have "paved the way"
for the present decision. In the Dean case the child was injured in an automobile ac-
cident in which the father was killed. Holding that the child was entitled to main-
tain the action against the father's estate, the court stated that no reason based upon
the parental immunity rule existed to prevent the suit once the relationship was
terminated. The same reasoning was employed in Gaudreau where the deceased
father's administrator was allowed to maintain a suit against an unemancipated
minor child for wrongful death arising out of an automobile accident. The Briere
court, in concluding, states:
[T]he Dean and Gandreau cases have already charted the course for a voyage
upon which it appears we, as well as many other courts, will inevitably embark.
It would serve no useful purpose to hesitate longer because we are faced with
objections based upon distinctions where, in the conditions existing today, no
substantial differences can be perceived.8 4
Seemingly, the court's sweeping language in totally rejecting the parental immu-
nity rule goes much further than the resolution of the issue stipulated at the begin-
ning of the opinion.35 Hopefully more courts will recognize the need for allowing ac-
tions by unemancipated minor children against their parents in tort for personal
injuries. The Briere opinion should be regarded as the end of the voyage charted by
the Dean36 and Gaudreau37 cases and must stand as a map for other courts to follow
in ending the discrimination against this class of persons.
81Briere v. Briere, supra note 1, at 590.
106 N.H. 314, 211 A.2d 410 (1965).
'n 106 N.H. 551, 215 A.2d 695 (1965).
8
,Briere v. Briere, supra note 1, at 590.
8 See supra note 1 and text.
106 N.H. 314, 211 A.2d 410 (1965).
87106 N.H. 551, 215 A.2d 695 (1965).
2. Kemp v. Rockland Leasing, Inc., 51 Misc. 2d 1073, 274 N.Y.S.2d 952
(1966)-Negligence-Derivative Liability of Third Party for Parent's
Injury to Child.
PLAINTIFF, AN UNEMANCIPATED INFANT, brought an action against Rockland Leasing
Corporation to recover damages for injuries sustained while a passenger in a motor
vehicle operated by plaintiff's mother and owned by defendant Rockland. The cause
of action was based on a statutory provision which attributes to the owner of a motor
vehicle the negligence of a person "using or operating the same with the permission,
expressed or implied, of such owner."' The defendant moved to dismiss the com-
plaint for insufficiency, contending that, since under New York case law an un-
emancipated infant cannot bring an action for non-willful negligence against his
I N. Y. VEmCLE AND TIAFrIc LAw § 388 (1966).
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parent, the plaintiff could not recover from the defendant because his liability under
the statute is derived from the liability of the operator of the motor vehicle, the
plaintiff's mother. Treating the problem without binding authority, the court found
that the public policy considerations underlying parent-child immunity would not
be offended by allowing the action. Held, that the immunity of the mother was per-
sonal to her and could not be asserted in the defense of defendant Rockland. The
motion to dismiss for insufficiency was denied.2
The principle that a child cannot sue his parents for a tort is not derived from the
common law but is rather a product of American case law.8 The doctrine first ap-
peared in a Mississippi case in 18914 and has since been adopted by virtually all of the
states.5 The State of New York adopted the rule in 1928 in Sorrentino v. Sorrentino.0
The basic reasons presented by the courts for the rule are to prevent litigation from
disturbing family unity, to preserve domestic tranquility and parental discipline,
to keep the family funds undivided and to prevent collusion within the family where
there is insurance coverage.7 Although the rule has been the object of severe criti-
cism,8 it has been changed in only a few states. 9
In 1928, the same year the New York courts adopted the parent-child immunity
doctrine, Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co. was decided.10 There the court al-
lowed a wife to recover from her husband's employer, under the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior, for damages resulting from her husband's negligence although
there was a general rule in New York that a wife could not sue her husband for negli-
gence." The court held that the disability of the wife or husband to maintain an
action against the other for injuries to the person was not a disability to maintain a
like action against the other's principal or master.' 2 The basis of the reasoning is that
the employee "has committed a tort which by ordinary rules of law should make the
master liable, and there is no reason to include the latter within the purely personal
immunity of the family."'8 The court in Schubert points out that for the defendant
to assert the immunity he would have "to maintain that the act, however negligent,
2 Kemp v. Rockland Leasing, Inc., 51 Misc.2d 1073, 274 N.Y.S.2d 952 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
8Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 382, 150 At. 905 (1930).
' Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891). For the extension of the parent-child
immunity doctrine to negligence see, e.g., Taubert v. Taubert, 103 Minn. 247, 114 N.W. 763
(1908).
5 PROSSER, TORTS 675 (2d ed. 1955).
e248 N.Y. 626, 162 N.E. 551 (1928); see also Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N.Y. 425, 40 N.E.2d 236
(1942).
7 PROsSER, supra note 5, at 676.
6 See listing of critical material by Justice Jacobs in Hasting v. Hasting, 35 N.J. 247, 163
A.2d 147 (1960).
9Goller v. White, 20 Wis.2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963); Briere v. Briere, - N.H. -
224 A.2d 588 (1966). See also Young v. Rankin [1934] Sess. Cas. 499 (Scot.); Deziel v. Deziel,
[1953] 1 D.L.R. 651.
10 249 N.Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42 (1928).
n Schultz v. Schultz, 89 N.Y. 644 (1882); Allen v. Allen, 246 N.Y. 571, 159 N.E. 656 (1927).
12 Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co., supra note 10, at 255, 164 N.E. at 43.
'a PROSSER, supra note 5, at 678; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 217, comment b (1958):
"Immunity" is a word which denotes the absence of civil liability for what would be a
tortious act but for the relation between the parties or the status or position of the
actor .... Immunities, unlike privileges, are delegable and are available as a defense
only to persons who have them.
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was none the less lawful because committed by a husband upon the person of the
wife." 14 The courts which had decided the issue before Schubert'5 and those which
have subsequently rejected the reasoning in Schubert,'0 have pointed out that if re-
covery is allowed from the employer, then the employer has a cause of action against
the parent. The end result would be that the child would indirectly recover from the
parent via the employer and the policy considerations which give rise to parent-child
immunity would be defeated by circumvention.17 The decision in Schubert recog-
nized this possibility but rejected it, finding that the employee had an independent
duty to the employer to protect the employer's interest, and any subsequent action by
the employer was based on a cause of action completely independent from the action
by the child against the employer. 18 The reasoning in Schubert was extended to par-
ent-child immunity in New York in 1939 19 and today all states except Illinois,
whether Schubert is accepted or rejected, appear to come to the same conclusion
when dealing with husband-wife immunity or parent-child immunity.20
The court in deciding this case distinguished it from those cases where the liabil-
ity was based on respondeat superior on the basis that the principle of liabilty is
different.2' Thus distinguished, the case presented an issue having no binding au-
thority from a higher court in New York.22 The court, turning to policy considera-
tions, found that although the principle of liability based on the statute in the pres-
ent case is different from the principle of liability in respondeat superior, the nature
and extent of liability for both are the same and the same policy considerations gov-
ern both.28 The court reiterated that the "purpose underlying the parent-child im-
munity is to prevent litigation from disrupting the family and thus preserve do-
mestic tranquility and parental discipline." 24 The court concluded that to allow this
suit would in no way contravene this policy. The result reached by the court is a
logical extension of Schubert and is a result that should be expected in a state where
Schubert is accepted and the opposite result should be expected in a state where
14 Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co., supra note 10, at 256, 164 N.E. at 43.
15 See, e.g., Maine v. James Maine & Sons Co., 198 Iowa 1278, 1279, 201 N.W. 20, 21 (1924).
16 Annot., 1 A.L.R.3d 677 (1966).
17 Maine v. James Maine & Sons Co., supra note 15.
18 Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co., supra note 10, at 257, 164 N.E. at 43.
19 Harter v. Richardson Corp., 259 App. Div. 907, 12 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1939); see also Sullivan
v. Christiensen, 9 App. Div. 2d 624, 191 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1959).
20 Annot., supra note 16, at 683 n.l.
0 The court also distinguished the present case from Sikoran v. Keillor, 15 App. Div. 2d
6, 230 N.Y.S.2d 571 (1962), afJ'd., 13 N.Y.2d 610, 240 N.Y.S.2d 601, 191 N.E.2d 88 (1963). There
the injured person sued the owner of the motor vehicle using the same statutory provision.
The defendant owner was allowed to assert a statutory exception of the driver which pro-
vided to volunteer firemen an exception from civil liability for acts done in the course of
their duties, except for willful negligence or malfeasance. The court distinguished this
statutory exception from parent-child immunity on public policy considerations, saying that
the purpose of the statute granting such immunity to volunteer firemen would be defeated it
recovery was allowed from the owner.
2 But see Schomber v. Tait, 207 Misc. 328, 140 N.Y.S.2d 746 (1955) (where the owner was
in the motor vehicle); Baker v. Gaffney, 141 F.Supp. 602 (D.D.C. 1956) (applying Maryland
law to the same N.Y. statute with opposite result.)
21 Kemp v. Rockland Leasing Inc., supra note 2, at 958.
2
'Ibid.
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Schubert is rejected. 25 The majority of courts which have decided similar issues have
found that a respondeat superior relationship is created by implication of law and
have held the Schubert rule, if accepted by that state, as binding.2 6
There is strong indication that insurance has played a role in the development
of parent-child immunity.27 Where there is insurance which will protect the parent,
the basic policy considerations for the immunity are no longer present.28 One policy
consideration remaining-the possibility of collusion-has in essence been rejected
by New York.29 The barrier to allowing recovery where insurance is present is that
the presence of insurance should not create a cause of action where none would exist
without the presence of insurance.8 0 New Hampshire has approached the problem by
dropping parent-child immunity as a defense.31 New York appears unwilling to fol-
low because of those torts, usually those occurring in the home, where there is no
insurance coverage and where all of the reasons for the rule are present.8 2 However,
it appears that the courts will avoid the immunity, if logically possible, where there
is reasonable assurance that the policy considerations are not present. For example,
where the parent injures his child with a motor vehicle the child can recover if the
parent uses the motor vehicle in connection with his business. 8 In New York the
presence of compulsory automobile insurance protects the parent.34 Where the in-
jury is not by motor vehicle, but by other means, the presence of the widespread use
of public liability insurance would in most cases protect the parent-businessman.8 5
In the usual respondeat superior case involving a motor vehicle,8 6 the courts are
reasonably assured that the fear expressed by the courts rejecting Schubert-that the
parent-employee will eventually bear the cost of the child's suit against the em-
ployer-will not materialize since the insurance that the employer is required to
carry must protect not only the employer-owner but also the employee-driver.87 In
a respondeat superior case not involving a motor vehicle, the parent may eventually
bear the cost of the child's recovery, unless the employer carries insurance with
omnibus type coverage similar to that required by the compulsory motor vehicle
25Annot., supra note 16.
8 Miller v. J. A. Tyrholm & Co., 196 Minn. 438, 265 N.W. 324 (1936); Broaddus v. Wilken-
son, 281 Ky. 601, 136 S.W.2d 1052 (1940); Le Sage v. Le Sage, 224 Wis. 57, 271 N.W. 369(1937); May v. Palm Beach Chemical Co., 77 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 1955); Ownby v. Kleyhammer,
194 Tenn. 109, 250 S.W.2d 37 (1952); Baker v. Gaffney, supra note 22.
PROSSER, supra note 5, at 677.
0 Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 474, 215 N.Y.S.2d 35, 37, 174 N.E.2d 718, 720 (1961)
(dissent).
Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N.Y. 106, 22 N.E.2d 254 (1939) (action for personal tort allowed
between minor brother and sister).
" Siembab v. Siembab, 202 Misc. 1053, 112 N.Y.S.2d 82 (Sup. Ct. 1952); but see Dunlap v.
Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905 (1930); Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939);
Edwards v. Royal Indemnity Co., 182 La. 171, 161 So. 191 (1935).
81Briere v. Briere, supra note 9.
3 Badigian v. Badigian, supra note 28.
Dunlap v. Dunlap, supra note 30; Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952);
Worrell v. Worrell, supra note 30; Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash.2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952); Lusk
v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932).
" N.Y. VEmCLE AND TRAmrsc LAw § 311 (4)(a) (1966).
8Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 262, 212 N.W. 787, 788 (1927) (dissent).
8 Annot., supra note 16.
87 Sullivan v. Christiensen, supra note 19.
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insurance. If the employer is not insured or if his insurance does not have such omni-
bus coverage, the employer or his insurance company can recover the amount of
their loss to the child from the parent. In the present type of case, there is assurance
that the parent will not eventually pay the amount of his child's recovery to either
the owner of the motor vehicle or to such owner's insurance company, because of the
compulsory insurance. The omnibus clause in the compulsory insurance protects the
parent. Where the motor vehicle is registered in a state not requiring such coverage,
or where the owner fails to comply with the statutory requirements of insurance, the
result can be different, but such situations are remote and insignificant, especially in
light of the child's ability to recover indirectly from his parent in a respondeat
superior case not involving an automobile.
The result in this case is desirable, but it is not logical to require the parent's in-
surer to indirectly pay the child via itself as also the insurer of the owner, when the
car driven by the parent belongs to someone else, and then to not require the par-
ent's insurer to directly pay the child if the car belongs to the parent. The desired
result could be achieved by not applying parent-child immunity to torts involving
motor vehicles; this can be achieved by the legislature. Another method, perhaps the
better, would be for the courts to follow the lead of those courts which have dropped
parent-child immunity as a defense in negligence actions.
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